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I. INTRODUCT.rON 
Tqe main object of this thesis is to make a 
preliminary research of the private enterprises in the 
Brazilian economy relating to the cement industry and to 
investigate the possibility of establishing a cement mill 
there with United States capital. The cement industry can-
not operate in-an isolated manner but exists in relation to 
other forms of private enterprise within the context of a 
country's economy, which in the case of Brazil is a growing 
one. 
The cement industry, in Brazil as a whole, earned 
52% orl capital invested in the year 1954.* Such a rate of 
return is considered very high even in a fast expanding 
economy. For pr~vate investors with the motive of making 
a profit, this opportunity is worth inv~stigating. 
The main reason behind the high rate·of 52~ return 
can be summarized in the following words - small supply 
versus high demands. Looking first at the supply, Brazil's 
cement production has increased from eight hundred thousand 
metric tons at the end of World War II to two-and-a-half 
~v d million tons in 1955.'~ This is an increase of over 300~ 
within the short space of a decade. But comparing this 
figure to that of the United States, which has approximately 
* 3, PP• 44. 
~Ht 61, PP• 248. 
the same physical area as Brazil, it is extremely small. 
America produced some fifty million tons in 1955,* or 
twenty times more than Brazil. 
Perhaps the present American cement industry is a 
good example of what the Brazilian cement industry will 
. 
eventually be like. Similar to the United States of the 
nineteenth century, B~azil has a vast frontier as yet uri-
settled. The country. also contains large deposits of im~ 
portant minerals, is experiencing rapid industrialization, 
increase of population; and economic growth. 
Viewing the present cement industry in u.s., we 
find it is enjoying an unprecedented period of prosperity. 
During the years of 1954 and 1955, the industry operated at 
very close to effective capacity. With grim memories still 
fresh of the l930 1.s, when expensive mills were abandoned, 
or operated a~ half capacity, the compani~g~were reluctant 
:-·-' 
to engage in an all-out expansion program.~H~ But as the-con-
struction boom progressed, the announcement of the Federal 
highway aid bill, and more diversified use of cement in pre• 
cast· and other forms, the cement industry dropped its pes's!'"' 
mistic viewpoint, and greatly expanded. According to a 
Bureau of Mines survey, a fifteen percent jump in total 
~~ 7, PP• 1. 
~B" 55 
s. 
capaei ty was expected in 1956. 4~· The cement industry ever 
since the war, has enjoyed a remarkably high rate of return 
compared· with the other industries of the country .. ~H~ The 
fbllowing are some recent statistics of leading cement pro-
ducers in the United States: 
TABLE I: 
Financial Statistics of Seven Leading Cement Producers 
in the United States 
Company 
1954 
1955 
General 
1.954 
1955 
Ideal 
1954 
1955 
Lehigh 
1954 
1955 
Lone Star 
1954 
1955 
Per Share 
Earnings 
(dollars) 
3.29 
3.94 
3.37 
4.20 
2.10 
2.46 
4.37 
5.11 
* 18' .pp • 96 • 
-hY} :19 
1954-1955 
Net Sales Shares 
(thousand Outstanding 
dollars) (thousand) 
29,269 
31,2·24 
33,444 
38,906 
58,976 
69,972 
62,065 
70,895 
84,439 
91,514 
1,761 
1,761 
2,080 
2,080 
3,289 
3,289 
3,803 
3,803 
2,893 
2·,893 
Profit Margin 
After Taxes 
(percent) 
20·.4 
21~0 
m8.8 
19.8 
12.9 
13.4 
15.2 
16.1 
Company 
Marguette 
1954 
1955 
Penn Dixie 
1954 
1955 
Per Share 
Earnings 
(dollars) 
2.08 
2.26 
Net Sales 
(thousand 
dollars) 
36,195 
38,228 
31,835 
43,065 
Shares 
Outstanding 
(thousand) 
2,625 
2,625 
2,655 
2,655 
Profit Margin 
After Taxes 
(Eercent) 
15.1 
15.5 
Source: Cement Industry Outlook; Reynolds & Co., Stoc~ · 
Department, May 24, 1956. Profit Margin after 
Taxes column calculated by the authoro 
When a well-developed country such as. the U. s~ 
finds herself short of cement at various stages, it is not 
surprising that Brazil, an undeveloped but expanding country, 
is so much in need of this basic commodit,r. 
The present need for cement is great in Brazil; and 
as mentioned before, is increasing rapidly. The number of 
automobiles in use has doubled since 1948. if' With truck manu-
facturing and assembly plants being planned and built in the 
recent years, trucking looms as the main form of commercial 
transportation for Brazil in the future. Yet only less than 
ten per cent of Bra.zi.l's highways are paved and consid-ered 
to be all-weather roads. Out of these, only a small fraction 
are cement highways. So the demand for cement in highway 
construction alone will be exceedingly large in the near 
future. 
New construction for residential and industrial 
purposes has been proceeding at a very high level ever since 
~to 61, PP• 324. 
the· end of World War II. an indication of this is that 
building permits granted at various state capitals have 
nearly doubled in number since 1948. Even at this pace, 
shortage of housing is severe in nearly all parts of Brazil. 
As construction activities increase ( and there are no reasons 
why they should not) an even greater supply of cement will be 
called for. 
The power industry is another field that will re-
' quire large amounts of cement in the ~ture. Brazil has the 
sixth largest hydroelectric potential* in the world; yet in 
1954 only about.fifteen per cent of the total potential was 
inatalled. Since the country does not have high-grade coal 
nor a large domestic petroleum industry, hydroelectric and 
possibly atomic power seems to be the most promising and 
logical source of power. New dams ·and generating plants are 
b~ing planned and built every year to meet the everincreas-
ing demands of the industries. 
The government, recognizing the imp~rtance of this 
industry to the whole econom~ has adopted policies to en• 
courage investments in this expanding field. In fact, the 
Federal government has built and is ·operating two cement 
plants of its own. Reduction in taxation and suspension of 
custom duties on imported cement manufacturing equipment 
* 4, PP• 152. 
11. 
constitute legislation passed to stimulate expansion in the 
cement field. The Brazilian Economic Development Bank is 
willing to lend economic assistance, depending on each indi· 
vidual case. 
Turning away from the favorable aspects of high 
profit rate and increasing demands, the difficulties of 
establishing a new cement plant in Brazil are now discussed. 
The main problems are briefly described in the following para-
gra:phs. 
' The cement manufacturing process is highly m~chan-
ized, and is, therefore, extremely expensive. Accordi,ng to 
the Portland Cement Association of the United States, the 
capital invested per worker in a cement plant is twice as 
high as that of an average industrial plant."'" All machinery 
and equipment have to be imported into Brazil which presents 
no easy undertaking. The different and complicated import 
regulations, exchange control and government red tape involve 
both time and effort. Brazil has a serious lack of technical 
personnel. due to deficiencies in technical training schools. 
Engineers m d technicians must also be imported to direct the 
ins~allation of the equipment. Acquiring a good technical 
staff to operate the plant after its installation is yet an-
other serious problem that has to be solved. 
-:11- 6, PP• 17. 
The raw material for cement consists mainly of 
limestone, oyster shell, clay, and gypsum. All of these 
can be easily found in Brazil, but the problem lies in 
the ability to find a locale that contains most of them. 
Furthermore, if possible, this area must be near the prin~ 
cipal market for cement, since both the raw material and 
the finished prod~ct are heavy and bulky and the transpor-
tation facilities in Brazil are exceedihgly poor; the high• 
way systems are not extensive; the railroad trackage is 
small; and antique equipment is in use; and the coastal 
shipping consists of only a very small number of vessels. 
Moving either the raw material to the plant or the cement 
to the market over long distances would cause the cost to 
skyrocket. 
According to the Portland Cement Association of 
the United States, it required 8.44 gallons of petroleum 
product, 115.1 pounds of coal, or 1519 cubic feet of natur-
* al gas to ma~e one 376-pound barrel of cement. Brazil is 
a country that does not have any one of these commonly 
used fuels in abundance, and any industry that uses such 
a large quantity of fuel as does the cement industry has a. 
serious problem. Although several oil refineries have gone 
into operation recently, crude oil still has to be import~ 
ed. Brazil is still very far from solving its fuel shortage. 
~to 6, PP• 18,. 
The problems presented above are merely some of 
the important ones that will be encountered in promoting 
a new cement mill in Brazil. 
There are also some disadvantages inherent in the 
cement industry. The manufacturing of this commodity is a 
costly process; as stated, yet the product is cheap. For 
example, in the Uni~ed States, fi~ished cement sells £or 
less than a penny a pound compared with six cents for sugar 
and 3~ cents for steel. Forthermore, the cement machinery, 
. . 
despite its e~~remely high cost, cannot be adapted for making 
anything else. A certain amount 6f lime~burning can be done 
in a kiln, and it is theoretically possible to process low~ 
grade iron ores, but it is still a fact that all you can 
make with a cement mill is cement. ~to Of course, these two 
points are less apparent in Brazil than in the u. s., as 
cement in Brazil commands a higher price and there is a 
shortage of cement manufacturing equipment, but they are 
well worth noting. 
~to 55. 
II. SPEAKING OF BRAZIL 
A) Geographic and Climatic Brazil 
Brazil, situated in the Eastern part of South 
America, is not only the largest of the American republics, 
but the fourth largest country in the world. It has an area 
of 3,289,440 square miles, equivalent to 1.7 percent of the 
total surface of the globe, or 5.7 percent of the total dry 
land. Brazil's coastline extends for some 4,600 miles, 
which is longer than the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the 
United States combined.* However, a very short distance from 
the coast at Salvador (Bahia) to Porto Alegre, capital of 
the Southernmost state of Rio Granoe do Sul, lies a ,great 
escarpment. The natural wall~like barrier is surmounted by 
ranges which reach elevations of 7,000 or 9,000 feet. Only 
a few unimportant rivers cut through this mountain to the 
sea. This formidable geographic barrier is definitely one 
of the main reasons why most of the populace are concentrated 
along the ?oast. Penetration into the interior across the 
mountain ranges is extremely difficult. Not many stretches 
of navigable riv.er are .available, as major rivers in the heart 
of Brazil flow away from the coast*'" and open into the ocean 
through other countries. Railroads meet some seemingly in~ 
surmountable obstacles as they try to cross this h~ge 
~f. 3,pp. '11-12 .. 
~~f- 4, PP• 5. 
Figure I . 
Brazil- Principal Rivers md Cities 
Source: Map prepared for Latin American Sales Index by C.S. Hammond and Company, 
published by Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. 
South .America map from Wythe, George and Others, Brazil, an Expanding 
Economy, New York, Twentieth CePtury Fund, 1949, Frontispiece Page. 
escarpment. The tracks have to wind around mountains and 
through tunnels. In fact, one company has to resort to a 
oog.road, while another plan calls for steel cables to haul 
the oars up the steep climbs. 
Behind t'he cliff lies a great central plateau. It 
starts at the states of Maranhao, Piaui, and Pernambuco in 
the north, extends southward across much of the states of 
Bahia, Minas Gerais, and Sao Paulo, and westwar~ into Goias 
and Mato Grasso.* Two-thirds of the entire Brazilian terri-
tory consists of highlands -- plateaus ranging from a few 
hundred feet to aroun'd 3, 000 feet, surmounted here and there 
by low mountains. The area is an old land geographically, 
and such mountains as do exist are worn and smooth. There 
are no high and rugged peaks comparable to those found in the 
Andes or the Rockies. 
North of this central plateau lies the Amazon River 
basin, consisting mainly of low, lush tropical forests, ex-
tending to the Guiana highlands on the border of Venezuela 
and British Guiana. To the south of the plateau lies a lower 
I 
and less hilly one, which is suitable for raising··of cattle, 
;.Hf sheep, hog·s and agrioul tural pro duo ts • •. 
About 93% of the Brazilian area is in the tropics, 
but the widespread belief that the country lies in a tropical 
>!~ 1, PP• .15. 
-$~ 4, PP• 5-6. 
17. 
~} 
rain forest is a big ballacy. Only in the Amazon basin is 
the climate hot and humid, where it is uncomfortable to 
live and work. In the rest of the country the heat of the 
summer month is greatly moderated~ because of the steady 
trade winds along the coast and the high altitide in the 
interior. During the winter, however, the climate for the 
most part i~ tropical, as snow is seldom seen except in 
the mountains of the South. With the exception of the 
equatorial region, Brazil is blessed with a temperate cli-
mate. ~uite often the temperature variation in a 24 hour 
period (up to 15°F.) is greater than the difference be-
tween the average temperature of the hottest and .the cold-
est month of the year. <3H~ 
There are several geographical and climatic fac-
tors that tend to impede the economic development of Brazil 
in addition to those mentioned, namely, (1) the escarpment 
along the south and ce:iltral coast, (2) the exhausting 
tropical weather in the Amazon region~ (3) the extreme 
hilf.y nature of the hinterlands close to the coast (4) the 
un-navigable nature of some of the rivers, ,and (5) the fact 
. that the soil of the tropical forests is subject to rapid 
bleaching and erosion when the land is cleared for cultiva~ 
tion. However, there are compensating factors in the 
4~ 4, PP• 6 • 
~B~ 4, l)p • 7 • 
l ' 
18. 
existence of potentia_lly and still largely untapped mineral 
wealth, of large hydro-electric potential, and of certain 
areas with deep fertile soil, especially along the coast and 
in some parts of Southern and Central Brazil. All in all, 
the country can be considered rich, and it has a varied re-
source base for industrialization. It also possesses greater 
opportunities for a tropical export crop production than 
*.· 
exists elsewhere in Latin-America. 
B) Government 
The United States of Braz~l (Estadoe Unidos Do 
Brazil), established in'l889 as a rep~blic, has a federal 
form of government modeled in many ways on the United States 
of.America. In theory, the Federal government exercises 
specific powers,w~le the states have general powers. In 
practice, however, the Federal government is much more ex-
tensive in Brazil than in the United States. The entire 
fields of civil, commercial, criminal, electoral, and labor 
laws are under the jurisdiction of federal authorities. They 
also have the power to "intervene" in a state and set up com ... 
missions in place of the e~cted officials, under certain 
circumstances. 
Perhaps the one feature that makes the Federal 
government of such importance is its control of the chief 
sources of revenue. For example, in'l940, the Brazilian 
~~ 62, pp. 12. 
19. 
Federal government collected 56.2 percent of the total re-
venue, the states 34.7 per cent, and the municipalities 9.1 
percent. Compared with their counterparts in the United 
., 
States in the same year, the figures show 34.8 percent for 
the .Federal, 25.4 percent for the states, and 39.8 percent 
for the municipali.ties • .;t-
The Brazilian government also has more control 
over the economic life of the nation than the United States 
has. The Bank of Brazil, controlled by the Federal govern~ 
ment, is by far the largest and strongest financial institu-
tion in the country, having numerous branches in every state. 
Its exchange department controls the nation's foreign ex-
change resources. 
All legislation pertaining to miner~ls, waters, 
electric power, forestry and natural vegetation, and hunting 
and fishing is passed only by the Federal government. In 
recent ye'ars, the government has ventured into projects 
embracing a variety of activities, including cement plants, 
alcohol distilleries, steEmship companies, railroad companies, 
power projects, engine factories, steel mills, min~ng com-
panies, the petroleum industry, etc. The trend seems to be· 
' toward increasing government influence over the economic life 
.t~ mf the nation •• 
~~ 4, PP• 33-34. 
~Hf 4, PP• 35-36. 
C) Fact~ in Favor of Industrial Development 
Brazil has often been mentioned as the land of 
opportunity. Industries have, in the past, enjoyed very 
profitable years, and are continuing to do so. We shall now 
look at some of the 'Underlying factors that will favor eon-
tinuous industr.ial development. 
One of the most favorable factors is the high pro-
tective tariff. At the present time, .duties protect practi-
eally all nationally manufactured products, placing the 
domestic industry in a very advantageous position.* Many 
economists will argue about the bad effects of 'a high tariff 
on the nation, but at the present moment it serves to .stimu-
late expansion of new industries and old. 
The rapid increase of population, the steady rise 
in the standard of living, and greater purchasing power of the 
population are certainly to be considered~sD~ong aids to the 
industrial growth of Brazil. IDuring the early stages of 
indus.trialization-, the market was largely concentrated in the 
cities, where most of the income and wealth were located. 
But the renewed pos!bility of sizeable profits from coffee 
growing and food crops has been responsible. for tire ·birth and 
gzi§wtli :or ·-!l?Errge numbers o-r towns in the interior. With a 
much improved transportation system comparefl. w1, tp. that of 
J,~ 1, pp. 281-282 
21. 
pre-war days, the market for industrial products has .broad-
ened to a considerable degree.* 
The modernization of agricultural methods w~ll 
~end to help industrial development. Witn>better farming 
equipment, improved seeds, fertilizers and methods of culti-
vation, agricultural production is increasing at a fast 
pace. As farmers receive more income, their power of con-
sum.ption will expand. This w.t 11 lead to their purchasing 
more industrial products, the expansion of various industries 
being thereby encouraged. 
During World War II, a very favorable climate for 
ind~trialization existed in Brazil. It brought·into the 
co~try a new group of entrepreneurs from the war torn 
countries of Europe. Unlike the partiarchal, or. closely· 
knitted ~amily firms of the old era, this group is keenly 
interested in the adoption of uniform industrial standards, 
and is alert to new technological and market opportunities • 
.. 
Gradually, personal firms have given away to impersonal 
corporations financed by numerous individuals and managed 
. \ 
by professional managers. These changes have put Brazilian 
industries on a stronger foundation, insuring a healthier and 
faster growth. • .JHfo 
l 
* 62, PP• 9-10. 
-IH~ 62, PP• 6-7. 
D) Factors Unfavorable to Industrial Development 
One of the most important of these unfavorable 
factors is the lack of an easily accessible and abundant 
supply of ~oal and oil. The shortage of coal has affected 
the steel industry, although Brazil contains whole mountains 
of iron ore, the shortage of these two basic commodities 
has seriously handicapped the power industry necessary for 
industrial development. The lack of transportation faci-
lities also has been a handicap, since the nation-wide 
distribution of industrial products is difficult.4f- The 
present~ate and future development of the fuel, power,' and 
transportation industries is thoroughly disc~ssed in later· 
chapters. 
The insufficiency of capital for investments has 
been another great drawback. Large amounts of foreign capi~ 
tal have been poured into the countr,r, but the shortage of 
nationally owned and controlled capital has slowed down in~ 
dustrial growth. 
The lack of sufficient technical personnel is an im~ 
portant factor in the retardation of industrialization. ~ot 
only is there a serious shortage of engineers in Brazil, 
but technical supervisors, trained foremen, and skilled 
workers are also lacking. This is a deficiency that has to 
i~ 1' pp • 280 • 
be corrected before industrial development .can proceed 
unimpeded.~~ 
Another aspect which is unfavorable, is the 
continued reluctance to admit outside parti~ipation in the 
development of the country's immense natural resources. 
Perhaps even more serious is the prevailing personalized 
character of the government, and a reluctance to adopt and 
pursue firm financial policies, based on the objective 
appraisal of what is best in the long run for the nation-
al interest. This has resulted in technical and economic 
considerations which have been overridden all too often 
by personal and group politics. Moreover, shortcomings 
in public admin~tration not only are responsible for _ 
throttling certain sectors of industrial development but 
constitute a most serious obstacle to the sound economic 
growth of Brazil.~H~ 
~Eo l· pp. 28Q-281 
~H~ 62, pp • l3e 
III. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN BRAZIL AS RELATED TO 
THE CEMENT INDUSTRY 
A} Economic Conditions in 1951 and 1952 
During the years 1951 and 1952, coffee prices on 
the New York market remained at an all-time high. For 
example, the price for Brazilian "Santos 4" (the type of 
doffee most commonly sold on the world market) stood at 
about $1.20 a kilo compared with the mid-1950 price of 
$1.05. Hence, total earnings from coffee exports were 
greatly increased. As a result of this, Brazil's imports 
soared to an all-time high. -lt-
The rapid rate of industrial expansion which start~ 
ed in the 130 1 s (see Figure II) continued in 1951, notwith~ 
standing the heavy volume of imports. In 1952, the growth 
eased very slightly. There was a continued increase in the 
production capacity of several basic industries, and a sub~ 
stantial number of new projects, tending to fill large gaps 
in the industrial structure, were undertaken. During this 
period, there was renewed heavy industrial investment in 
Brazil. Although much of the initiative is of domestic 
origin, either public or private, the participation of for-
eign capital and technical skills has been of prime im-
portance to a l.arge number of these projects • .Jm 
-3} 57, PP• 151. 
-lHfo 57, pp • 183•184.-
Figul:'e II 
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In tlie case of cement, the basis for construe-
tion material and the building industry, there was a re-
covery of the rate of increase in production in 1953, 
through the substantial increase in capacity which had 
previously been planned. Whereas in 1951, production rose 
only by four percent, owing primarily to deficiencies in 
capacity, the 1952 figure was eleven percent higher than 
that of the Irevious year. The new installations have 
been particularly important in view of the large consump-
tion and the consequent need for importing substantial 
amounts in both years in order to supplement domestic pro-
duction. The tendency of the new projects is toward build• 
ing larger and therefore more economical units than in pre-
vious years, and the industry has been decentralized. In 
. 
1951, a plant with an annual capacity of 120,000 tons 
entered production in the Paraiba Valley, using blast fur-
nace slags from Volta Redonda, the largest steel mill in 
Latin-America. This is the first of its kind in South 
America. Another l~ge new plant located in Porto Alegre, 
uhe largest seaport in the southern section of the country, 
was aompleted also within this period. More capacity in 
r 
excess of half a million tons was also added to some of the 
existing plants. Brazil thus became the largest producer 
in the Latin-American countries~ 
The investments in the cement industry, some of 
--them aided by foreign capital, will help to save foreign 
currency and to provide a more adequate local and regional 
supply.* 
B) Economic Conditions in 1953 and 1954 
The coffee enterprises in Brazil, stimulated by 
excellent world prices and with strong government encourage• 
ment, were attempting to recover pre-war production. But 
during 1953, the remaining Latin-American producers were 
gradually obtaining a small share in the market formerly 
held by Brazilian coffee. The progress of these other 
countries was much greater than that of Brazil, the princi-
pal producer of the world. Their 1953 harvest increased al~ 
most fourteen percent over the previous crop. On the other 
hann, Brazilian production was affected by unfavorable 
weather conditions. Although the harvested area was two 
percent larger, the output was smaller compared with that 
of 1952. The year 1954 saw the export· of coffee much below 
average, because of the severe frost in 1953 which had dam-
aged a great number of coffee trees. A sharp drop in May 
which persisted throughout December, especially in the ex~ 
ports to the United States, reduced Brazil's foreign ·cur-
rency income greatly. This, in turn, lessened Brazil's 
ability to import during this period. Although there were 
some raw-material stocks accumulated as a result of the heavy 
* 57, PP·• 186 .. 
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imports during the 1951-1952 perioq, the rate of increase 
* in industrial output slackened. 
Because of the lack o~ foreign-exchange recources, 
a new exchange control system was established in October, 
1953. This has been favorable to the industries, although 
in some sectors there has been some discontent over the 
order i~ which import priorities have been drawn up. But 
higher prices and the shortage of finished foreign goods 
have stimulated domestic investments expecially in the capi• 
tal goods industry. In 1954, Brazil's indust~ development 
continued at a rapid pace, despite r~sing·wages, uncurbed 
inflation, and import problems inherent in foreign trade 
~'-''-controls. •n• 
The fortunes of the general industries of Brazil 
did not affect steel and cement producers. Large shortages 
of these basic commodities still remained, and the expansion 
plans continued to develop normally. Four new cement plants 
were built in 1953 and went into operation early in 1954. In 
some cases, cement plants encountered some transportation 
difficulties. But at the end of 1954, despite an increase of 
13 percent in producbion over the previous year, Brazil once 
again round herself in serious need of cement, which was not 
*'H~ alleviated by imports. "' 
* 58, 'P~· 140. 
** 58, PP• 211-212. 
i~~t-*58, pp. 211-212. 
29. 
C) Economic Conditions in 1955 
,_ 
Economic growth in Brazil dur~ng 1955 was slow 
compared to the previous average rate. The industrial pro-
duction index, which includes construction and electrical 
power as well as manufacturing, increased only an estimated 
3~-compared with 7fo in 1954. of~ Industries manufacturing pro-
duction goods were affected most. Even some capital goods 
manufacturers remained stationary in this leveling-off period 
of economic growth. This lower level of activity was a re-
sult of restriction of bank credit, the scarcity and high 
price of certain raw material and capital goods, a smaller in-
flow of foreign capital, and the stagnation of the aggregate 
demand, which affected private investments. Most of these 
were the result of reduced exports partly because of the fall 
in coffee prices. Coffee is extremely important, as nQted 
before, ~s it constitutes more than fifty percent of the 
value of the coumtry's total exports. In 1952, as much as 
74% of the export revenue crune from coffee. This percentage 
has been decreasing, as Brazil is exporting some manufactured 
' goods to ~eighboring Latin-American countries, suqh as alarm 
clocl4;s t·o Argentine, lorries and sewing machines to Bolivia, 
and machine tools to Chile. Still coffee remained by far 
the most important commodity of Brazil's e~ort trade.~~ 
* 64, PP• 1. 
~~ 59, PP• 15 .. 
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Cotton, another valuable 
in foreign revenues earned. This, 
"-"" 
'-, \ 
'\.___ 
~ 
·~ 
crop, el s~"-~d a drop 
.. '\ ... 
witn the drop in coffee 
revenue, plus a large payment to short-term trade debit 
account really caused a severe shortage in foreign cur~ 
rencies. Rationing of foreign exchange was strictly en-
forced by the government. However, during the last.period 
of 1955, coffee prices recovered and large volumes were 
shipped. As eNports increas~d, the economy climbed back 
to its previous rate of growth. 
Out of this slump came one encouragement. The 
cement industry achieved a 9% increase in production over 
the previous year. While feeling the effects of a decline 
in private building activities, the replacement of imports 
and la~ge increases in public investments still enabledthe 
cement industry to expand. 'i~ 
D) Economic Conditions in 1956 
The Brazilian economy of 1956 was a mixture of 
bright and. gloomy shadows~ Brazil's external balance of 
payments ~howed surprising improvements, with a fairly large 
favorable trade balance. Its Dollar reserve was up, and re-
duced somewhat the huge foreign debt. On the other side, 
the internal financial position was bad, because of the con-
tinuation of inflation; furthermore, there was no end in 
* 64, PP• 1. 
31 .. 
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sight. The cost of living was up approximately 25%, and the 
* government had huge budgetary deficits. 
The main reason for this greatly improved trade 
balance is again coffee. Latin America exported more coffee 
in 1956 than in any other year in its history. The American~ 
consumer demand, which had been curtailed previously because 
of high prices, was restored to normal as prices returned to 
more reasonable levels. The fact that adverse weather condi" 
tions damaged the Colombian coffee crop, and t hat the Brazil 
coffee growers had a large crop, helped Brazil to regain its 
position as the supplier of 50% ofthe coffee consumed in the 
United States,.*~~< 
The year 1956 also saw Brazil inaugurate a new 
president in the person of Juscelino Kubitschek. He pledged 
himself to solve the nation's three basic deficiencies: 
food, po~er, and transportation. His policiew followed 
closely tpe SALTE plan of 1948; ~the name SALTE was de-
rived from the fields in which development projects fall: 
health (s~dB), food (alimentos), transportation (transporte) 
and energy resources ( energia) )~H*several loans were obtain ... 
ed from the United States to assist the various plans snd 
projects along these lines, and th~ Brazilian Federal 
.. 
Government's participation and investments were at an 
J,~ 4 9' pp • 58 • 
J.Ht- 46, PP• 63. 
-lBH!-60, pp. 59 o 
.... 4'(. ... 
all-time high. Nevertheless, because of the increasing 
, ... ~ 
population and ever-expanding indust~ial'i~ation, an end 
'"""" deficiencies is not even now~~, sight. The 
~ 
'--, 
to st~ive to keep pace with the indus~rial 
' ·" 
to these basic 
Government has 
,, 
~,~ 
-..., 
~---"'~ expansion that is taking place in Brazil~ 
Re~l estate and construction were the dominant """" -" "'\:_"=:_ 
activities in 1956. Investment in these fields can realize 
profits up to 50~ annually. The demand for housing was tre-
mendous as it still is, especially in the three Ja rge cities 
of Rio de Janeiro, Sao' Paulo, and Belo Eorizonte. For ex~ 
ample, the population of Sao Paulo increased from about 
two million in 1950 to three million in the middle of 1956. 
With this, building units have increased from 342,000 to 
about 456,000. By 1970, Sao Paulo is expected to have six 
and a half million inhabitants, which will mean a correspond-
ing rise in construction activities. Building permits in 
1956 were issued at a record-setting rate. This construc-
tion boom is not only in apartments and individual houses, 
but also in factories, plants, and machine shops. The super-
highway, Via Anchieta, which leads to the seaport of Santos, 
is already studded with factories representing various 
industries. It is constantly mentioned as the "Brazilian 
Detroit". 
RiO de Janerio is growing just as fast, with Belo 
Horizonte not far behind. Perhaps Rio's expansion is more 
-- ...... -, 
, ___ 
spectacular, since it does not have the'~hysical space to 
"-
spread that Sao Paulo has. Situated betwe\~~steep mountains 
"---< 
and Guanabara Bay, it has to find space in the'hills and 
"" 
4}, .. ~~ 
the ocean. ~ \-..~ 
'~ All these heavy-construction activities mean'only 
one thing to the cement industry: an added demand to the 
already existing one which the domestic industry cannot 
as yet meet. Although no statistics are yet av~ile. ble on 
the domestic production and consumption of cement itt 1956, 
there is no doubt that it will be much higher than 1955. 
Otherwise, the large increase in building will not be 
possible. 
E) Effect of Inflation on the Brazilian Economy 
Brazil, ever since 1939, has had an inflation un~ 
precerlented in severity in its history. This was in part a 
reflection of economic growth and the imbalances which ac-
companied it. Of course, worldwide inflationary pressures 
started by the war have also exerted some influence. Infla-
tion has been the most import~nt single cause of major dis-
equilibrium -- above all, as concerns the transportation 
system, the power supply, and the international economy. 
According to the best available index, the general 
level of wholesale prices rose by about 400% in the twelve 
year period, 1939 to 1952. Agricultural prices show~d a 
~fo. 48, pp • 58o 
34. 
much sharper rise than those of industrial products reflect-
ing the rapid increase in internal industrial productivity. 
No nation-wide cost-of-living data exist in Brazil. The 
only datum which is ~easonably satisfactory from the techni-
cal point of view, is that relating to wage earners in the 
city of Sao Paulo. From the base year of 1939 (= 100), 
this index of the cost of living reached 555 by the end of 
1952. The increase at a compound annual rate is about 16~ 
per year. This rate is nuch higher than the 2i% per year 
' compounded, experienced by Brazil hi~torically over a long 
,, 
period.~~ ,~,_, 
TABLE II 
Price Trends in Brazil 
1940-1952 
(Index Numbers 1939=100) 
Wholesale Cost of 
Prices Living 
Year Total Export Import 
Agricul- Indus- Food Total Prices Prices 
ture trial 
1940 104 110 106 104 104 110 122 
1941 125 123 124 117 116 143 131 
1942 144 148 146 129 133 280 160 
1943 168 182 174 159 vl54 226 168 
1944 187 210 198 196 . 210 230 172 
1945 232 228 229 242 259 249 184 
* 62, PP• 37 • 
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Wholesale 
Prices 
Cost of 
Living 
Year Total ,~ Export 
Agricul~ Indus- Food' Total Prices 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
ture trial 
274 
312 
366 
410 
495 
605 
(1) 
256 
250 
254 
266 
276 
324 
(1) 
(1) Not Availabie 
264 
278 
306 
334 
379 
453 
499 
308 296 
366 386 
417 418 
400 411 
430 435 
450 412 
545 '555 
~\., 
395 
380 
390 
590 
705 
670 
Import 
Prices 
214 
272 
276 
244 
208 
258 
248 
Source: The Development of Brazil; Report of Joint Brazil-
United States Economic bielopment Commission; Insti~ 
tute of Inter-American Affairs Foreign Operations 
Administration; Washington, D.C.; page 37; Table VII. 
A number of characteristics have tended to make 
36. 
Brazil more vulnerable to inflation than other countries \ 
which have gone through an earlier process of industrializa-
tion and development, such as the United States, Can~da, 
Russia, or Australia. 
Unlike the agricult~al system of the countries 
referred to above, the structure of Brazilian e~port agri-
culture consists mainly of coffee, cocao and cotton and is 
not based on essential foodstuffs, which could directly, and 
with immediate effect, be diverted to home consumption, thus 
offsetting one of the primary inflatfonary pressures -- namely, 
rising food prices. Brazil, in fact, has for long been a 
' 
" 
"' major producer of a specialized tropical eXport crop, with 
' 
food-crop production largely subordinate. 
' Brazil has not benefited to the same ~~tent as •, 
' the United Stated, Canada, and Australia, from a massive 
inflow of immigrants of productive age from a highly in-
dustrialized environment. Furthermore, the direct flow of 
capital into Brazil has not been as large as. in these other 
countries. ~t:-
Imports of consumer goods, which might have lessen-
ed the inflationary\pressure, have had to be greatly curtailed 
in favor of capital goods and r~w materials. The inflation 
and balance-of-payment pressures, in turn, discourage to some 
-''.1-'. 
extent the inflow of foreign capital .• '"'' 
Besides these structural factors which have made 
Brazil vulnerable to inflation, an institutional factor is 
involved. The country does not have an effective, indepen-
dent and non-political body entrusted with the supervision 
of the banking system and the coordination of the monetary 
and the credit policy. This has rendered the dispersal of 
bank credits unduly susceptible to regional and interest 
group pressures, and has made credit policies unduly re-
sponsive to short-term political influences. It tenqs to 
inhibit the adoption of orderly and sustained efforts for 
4~ 62, pp. 42. 
~H~ 62, pp .. 42 .. 
the attainment of a greater measure of internal price sta-
bility. The supply of money and bank credits to the domes-
tic economy have increased about ten times between 1939 and 
1952. The e~pansion of these maans o~ payments which was 
allowed to take place enabled the factors making for price 
increases to operate with full force. The instrument of 
credit policy was not used by the Government as a means 
of slowing down the progress of inflation, except during 
short periods. 
The government, instead, made feeble efforts to 
control inflation by holding down the rate~ charged by 
utility and transportation companies. In the face of 
rising prices, this action caused these public service 
companies to become unremunerative or, at least, far less 
profitable thrurr other branches of the econom~. Under these 
circumstances, investments have lagged precisely at a time 
' when rapid industrial and urban expansion has created an 
increasingly greater dem~nd ~or the services of these in-
dustries. The further narrq:wing of these bo.ttlenecks has 
threatened to retard continued economic growth. But in re-
cent years, the Government has awakened to the seriousness 
of these scarcities, and efforts have been made to correct 
~to them. 
* 62,pp. 30,40,44. 
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The inflationary atmosphere, however, has been 
\ 
a decided spur to industrialization and to~structural trans-
formation of the economy by encouraging the taking of risks. 
Each new successful·undertaking and each expansion of a city 
has created further opportunities for ~nvestment. The effect 
of industrialization and urbanization has been to provide 
little stimulus to voluntary saving, which has the effect of 
adding oil to a fire. While th~ incentive for voluntary 
saving has weakened, the traditional tendency of all groups 
in Brazil to invest their excess earnings in land and rirban 
real estate constructions, has strengthened. These invest-
ments, hovever, often do not contribute significantly towards 
raising the productivity of the economy, and have somewhat 
distorted the pattern of the total investment. As inflation 
progresses, it appears very clear that it has become an in-
cre~singly ineffectual and wasteful instrument for effecting 
the transfer of resources to investment. 
The Brazilian Government must now devise and im-
plement coordinated monetary, fiscal, exchange, and wage 
policies which willenable the country to maintain high levels 
of investment with a minimum of inflation and reduced pres~ 
sures on the balance of payments. 
The inflation, although inherently unhealthy for 
the country, has been decidedly good for the cement industry 
as it greatly stimulates industrialization and construction.* 
* 62, PP• 43-45. 
F) Future Outlook of the Brazilian Economy 
A country's economic growth has often been di-
vided by economists into four stages of development. The 
country starts being a young debtor; then it becomes a 
mature debtor, progressing by stages to a young creditor 
and a mature creditor. On this basis, the young debtor 
borrows from other countries; the mature debtor repays; 
the young creditor lends; the mature creditor has either 
stopped lending or is consuming capital. The difference 
between the mature debtor and the young creditor is to be 
found not in the balance of payments but in the balance 
~ 
of ~ndebtedness. The balance of payments shows a contin-
uous export surplus; it is simply that the excess of lia-
bilities over claims becomes a surplus of claims over 
liabilities.·;} 
On the basis of this analysis, Brazil can be 
considered on the threshold of the second stage in economic 
development. Its trade balance is starting to turn favor~ 
ably as the domestic industries rapidly expand. The huge 
foreign debt, which appears to be insurmountable at the 
present time, will be repaid as the foreign-exchange re-
sources improve. The whole Brazilian economy and foreign 
trade are, presently, quite dependent on coffee, which in 
turn relies among other things, on the weather. This 
~r. 2, PP• 367-377. 
makes the whole economy quite unstable. As the country 
grows, however, manufactured products will gradually take 
the place of agricultural products. On the other hand, 
. 
less capital goods will be imported as the basic industries 
of the country are established and are able to supply the 
needs of the country. As a matter of fact, Brazil's ex-
port of manufactured goods rose from five million dollars 
in 1954 to eighteen million in 1955~ Taking the basic 
industrial commodity -- steel -- Brazil already possesses 
the largest and most modern stael mill in South America 
at Volta Redonda. This plant, started in 1946 with an 
ann~al production of 350,000 tons, is now producing 
750,000 tons yearly, and is expected to increase its pro• 
duction to one million tons in the near future. Even with 
the present capacity, it is already ,supplying half of the 
country's requirements.~H~ All these figures ~re small com~ 
' 
pared with those of the United States, but the annual in-
crease is tremendous, and there are no signs of weakening 
in the foreseeable future. 
Of course, mild slumps, such as the one in 1955, 
are to be expected along with an upward swing, but on the 
whole the future looks promising. Domestic inflation 
* 59, pp. 31. 
4Ht 16, PP• 31. 
app~ars to hamper the economic growth, but it seems that 
this is the experience of every country at this stage of 
development. The problem at the present time is how to 
restrain it from running wild. In 1956, foreigh invest~ 
menta were pouring into the country at a record pace, 
wit~ an increasing number of projects being studied and 
waiting for approval. These moves, after the 1955 slump, 
seem to be a token of faith in Brazil's future.-s} 
What does all this mean to Brazil's cement in-
dustry? It means that Brazil will need more and still more 
cement. As has been noted, even a well-developed country 
like the United States still finds at times a shor,tage in 
this important basic building commodity. There seem to be 
no end to the need for cement. In Bnazil, although the 
yearly increase of production in cement seems fantastic 
(13% in 1954, 9% in 1955), the demand for this commodity 
is increasing at an even higher rate. 
~~ 49' pp. 58. 
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IV. TEE C:E!:MENT MANUFACTURING PROCESS 
AND THE CEMENT INDUSTRY IN BRAZIL 
A) The Cement-Making Process and Raw Materials 
There are two types of cements - natural and 
Portland. However, almost all of the cement manufac-
tured today is of the Portland type, chiefly because it 
does not require storage for an extended period in order 
' ' 
to gain strength, as does natural cement. Previously, 
natural cen ent was used in mixing with the Portland i;n 
order to increase its durability, workability, and 
moisture-and-acid resistivity; but a new method of adde 
ing an entrained agent to Portland cement has been de~ 
ve~oped which gives the same benefits at lower cost. 
This simpler and cheaper method has practically elimin-
ated the entire market for natural cement.* 
The manufacture of Portland cement is very 
often referred to in the industry as "putting mountains 
through a sieven. A tremendously large amount of heavy 
machinery and equipment, utilizing a large amount of 
electrical energy, is necessar.y. Over 80 separate op-
erations under carefully controlled conditions are re-
quired in making Portland cement. Two slightly different 
methods of manufacturing are possible -- the wet process 
~~- 9, PP• 33-40. 
43 .. 
and the dry process. The results of both methods are 
equally good, the choice depending on the type of raw 
material available. The wet process was developed in 
Europe, and the dry process started here in the United 
States. In Brazil, the wet process is used primarily. 
Let us consider first the wet process. The 
raw materials are first crushed to about' the size of 
coarse gravel. The size snd the number of crushers need~ 
ed depend entirely on the type of raw material u:;:~ed .• 
Some of the large crushers are cap,able of handling rocks 
of the size of a piano. After going through the crush~ 
ers, the various raw materials are mixed according to 
proportions by weight. The mixture is then ground to 
a fine powder by a ball or tube mill. These mills are 
made of large revolving cylinders lined with armored 
plates and filled with steel halls. By rotating action, 
these steel balls are carried up and dropped down, 
crushing the raw materials. 
In the next stage, these pulverized mixtures 
are thoroughly mixed with water in large cylindrical 
tanks with rotating beaters until they become a thick, 
soup-like substance known as "slurry." From these tanks 
the slurry is prped to the head of a gigantic rotary 
kiln. These kilns are long, slender tubes slightly in• 
clined so that the mixture can flow continuously to the 
) 
end. The kilns are lined with fire bricks and sup-
ported by huge bearings which slowly rotate at about 
the speed of one revolution per minute. To give an 
idea of the size of these kilns, they have a diameter 
. 
of about twelve feet, enough for an automobile to drive 
through; and a length of about 400 feet, which is eqpi• 
valrnt to the height of a thirty-story building. As 
the slurry progresses in the kiln, the water is rapidly 
evaporated by the heat blown into the kiln under pres-
sure. In t~e hottest area, the temperature can reach 
2,700°F. Under these conditions the raw materials are 
fused to form a new substance with its own physical and 
J 
chemical characteristics. These appear at the lower 
end of the kiln in the form of hard balls about the size 
of marbles. These are called "clinkers," and they are 
red hot. Various mechanical coolers are used to cool 
them· down so that they can be easily handled and stored. 
The heated air from these coolers is often returned to 
the kiln, which helps to reduce the need for fuel. 
The clinkers in storage are inert; therefore, 
they can be stored for a long tlme without deterioration. 
, 
The last step in the manufacture of cement is to pul-
verize these clinkers. Gypsum is added in the process 
to control the setting time of the cement. The final 
product is usually so fine that at least 90% will· pass 
through a sieve having 40,000 openings per square inch. 
The dry process in the manufacturing of Port~ 
land cement is almost entirely the same except in the 
mixing stage, where water is not added. The raw mater~ 
ials, after being crushed and pulverized, are mixed dry. 
(See Fig. II) .t 
Portland cement, by analysis, contmns the 
following ingredients: 
Lime 60 ... 65% 
Silica 20-24% 
Alumina 5- 9% 
Iron oxide 2- 4% 
Magnesia 1- 5% 
Sulphur troxide 1- 2% 
The principal raw materials used are: lime-
stone, oyster shells, clay or shale, argillaceous lime-
stone, blast-furnace slag and marl. According to the 
1949 Bureau of Mine statistics (latest available on raw 
materials for cement industry), an average of 645 pounds 
of raw materials are needed to produce a 376-pound 
barrel of cement. The loss of weight is caused by the 
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process of calcination in which moisture, carbon di-
.,,. 
oxide~ and o~lier gases are driven off in the kiln.' 
B) The Cemeh.1; ~.l~dustry in Brazil and the History of 
Its Pro.duc·tion from 1935 to the Present 
Brazil's cement indus~ry, starting out in the 
1930 1s, increas~d very steadily up to the start of tht 
Second World W~~· Since all of the cement manufact~rlng 
equipments are imported, the war called a halt to the 
expans~on of the industry. Furthermore, petroleum pro~ 
ducts were very scarce because almost all of the petro-
leum was imported, too. In fact, because of the short-
age of fuel, there was a decline in the yearly production 
·figures during the 1940-43 period. This caused a very 
serious shortage which was partly remedied by granting 
an'exemption of import duties on. cement for ninet~ days 
late' in 1942. However, as the war ended, the cement in-
dustry resumed its pre-war eipansion pace, and started 
to move ahead. With industrialization prqceeding at an 
l 
accelerated rate, the cement industry in Brazil doubled 
its capacity in the very short space of five years, from 
1950-55. 
In 1954, the entire cement industry in Brazil 
~ 
included eighteen factories operating a total of thirty-
six kil~s distributing over ten different states. It 
* 6, PP• 17-20. 
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has a payroll of over 9,000 persons. Another six plants 
were being erected at the time, with eight more kilns 
which are expected to enter into production in the 
1956-1957 period • .;~ As these new production facilities 
go into full operation, Brazil is expected to.cut down 
its import to a small percentage of the tot~l consump-
tion and raise the domestic production to over three mil• 
lion metric tons. This certainly does not mean that 
the national consumption has reached the saturation 
point. 
The price of imported cement in Brazil has 
been extremely high.''- The commodity is cheap, yet ,heavy 
and voluminous; therefore, when shipped over a long 
distance, the transportation charges are very costly. 
Furthermore, the Brazilian government, wishing to en-
courage domestic expansion of the cement industry, has 
placed a high tariff on this product, making importat-
tion of it less profitable. 
TABLE III 
Cement Production in Brazil and The United States 
Year 
!935 
-t~ 59, PP• 66. 
1935-1955 
(in thousand metric tons) 
Brazil 
366 
u.s. 
13,260 
49o 
~ TABLE III (cont.) 
Year Brazil u.s. 
1939 485 19,523 
1937 571 20,138 
1938 618 18,279 
1939 698 21,212 
1940 745 22,575 
l94i 768 28,387 
1942 753 31,496 
1943 747 22,901 
1944 810 15,542 
1945 774 17,537 
1946 826 28,102 
1947 914 31,994 
1948 1,112 35,210 
1949 1,281 35,939 
1950 1,386 38,724 
1951 1,456 41,824 
1952 1,618 42,,394 
1953 2,030 45,001 
1954 2,406 46,230 
1955* 2,630 51,000 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1955; United Nations; Page 
248 
4f- -- Brazil 1 s 1955 figure from Economic Survey of Latin 
America; United Nations; 1956; Page 66, Table 61. 
U.S. 1955 figure based on "Cement Industry Expansion" 
Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. report; March 7, 1956 
50. 
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B) Cement Production and Consumption of Latin-American 
Countries as Compared to Brazil 
Up until 1952, Argentina was Latin America's 
.. 
leading producer of cement, but s+nce then, Brazil has 
taken over. the le.adership, and is pulling ahead from 
the rest owing to recent expansion. The following is a 
production ~nd consumption table for the Latin-American · 
countries for the years 1954-1955. 
TABLE IV. 
PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF CEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 
1954-1955 
(in thousands of 
Country Production 
Argentina 1954 ••••••• 1,6'71 
1955 ........ 1,823 
Bolivia 1954 •••••••••• 33 
1955 •••••••••• 3'7 
. BRAZIL 1954 ••••••••••• 2,419 
1955 ••••••••••• ?,630 
Central America and 
Panama 1954 •••••••••• 221 
1955 •••••••••• 244 
Chile 1954 •••••••••••• '7'75 
1955 •• .' ••••••••• 801 
Colombia 1954 ••••••••• 962 
1955 .......... 1,04'7 
tons) 
Total 
1,944 
2,042 
37 
39 
2,'756 
2,9'70 
314 
361 
'7'77 
801 
956• 
1,034 
Consumption 
Per Capita 
(in kgs.) 
104 
10'7 
12 
12 
48 
51 
32 
36 
121 
118 
'7'7 
82 
~- . 
. ' t 
52. 
TABLE IV. {cont.) 
Country Production 
Cuba 1954.......... 420 
1955.......... 489 
Dominican Republic 
1954...... 160 
1955...... 234 
Ecuador 1954....... 95 
1955....... 146 
Haiti 1954......... ---
1955......... 25 
Mexico 1954........ 1,766 
1955........ 2,086 
Paraguay 1954...... 7 
1955...... 7 
Peru 1954.......... 485 
1955.......... 546 
Uruguay 1954....... 295 
1955....... 296 
Venezuela 1954..... 1,231 
1955 •••• ~ 1,234 
LATIN A1~ERICA 1954. 10,522 
1955. 11,645 
Total 
603 
691 • 
160 
234 
113 
162 
28 
36 
1,768 
2,037 
11 
11 
515 
576 
387 
412 
1,241 
1,258 
11,610 
12,664 
Consumption 
Per Capita 
(in kgs.} 
99 
109 
68 
97 
32 
44 
8 
10 
61 
69 
7 
7 
56 
61 
151 
159 
221 
218 
73 
79 
Source: Economic Survey of Latin America 1955, United 
Nations: Page 66; Table.6l 
Although Brazil is the leading producer of 
cement in Latin America, its per-capita consumption in 
1955 ranked eleventh among the fifteen countries tab-
ulated. The figure of 51 kilograms is below the average 
53. 
Latin America figure of 79 kilos, and extremely small 
compared with approximately 344 kilos for West Germany, 
305 kilos for the United Statesl, 229 kilos for the 
United Kingdom, or 218 kilos for Venezuela.* These 
statistics indicate that despite the tremendous growth 
in the cement industry in Brazil in recent years,.there 
is still a very broad margin for expansion. 
1) Calculated from estimated U~S. populatian figures 
and total cement production. 
* 59, pp~ 67. 
V. LOCATION AND OTHER FACTORS IMPORTANT IN 
PROMOTING A CEMENT MILL IN BRAZIL 
Before discussing the various factors under 
the division of sales, production, and finance, the 
author feel it is advantageous to examine first the 
transportation, fuel, and power i~dustries in Brazil. 
As mentioned before, they are serious deterrents to 
industrial expansion. Since cement mills usually rely 
heavily on the serviees of these industries, a thnvough 
discussion of their present condition at this point~will 
aid in our future exploration of the possibilities for 
investing in a cement mill in Brazil. 
A) Transportation 
Among the various forms of conveyance, the 
airline is the most advanced and best equipped mode of 
transportation in Brazil, but it is quite apparent that 
it cannot be used for moving the raw materials and 
cement. Therefore, only trucking, railroading and 
coastal shipping will be discussed. 
1) Highways and the Trucking Industry. 
In the year 1956, the foremost development in 
the Brazilian industrial field was the birth of an aut6-
motive industry. Mercedes Benz do Brazil,(Socidade 
55. 
Anonimaj a branch of Mercedes Benz in West Germany, 
started manufacturing trucks in September; and another 
German concern, DKW~ went into production in the month 
of November. About 50% of the parts are made in Brazil, 
.JJt 
with the remainder imported. In December, General 
Motors Corporation announced that the Brazilian govern-
ment had approved its plans to make trucks in Brazil. 
A modern foundry for engine blocks, gray iron and mal~ 
leable casting, and an engine plant will be built on 
a new plot of about 240 acres at San Jose de Campos, 
about sixty miles from Sao Paulo. A complete six-
cylinder Chevrolet-type gasolene engine will be pro-
duced by the end of 1958. This, coupled with the exist-
ing vehicle-assembly and manufacturing facilities, will 
give General Motors a large share of the truck market. 
These steps are only the initial stage of General Motor's 
truck program. Activities are expected to broaden to 
inolt!.de wider ranges of models of trucks and buses. iH} 
Several other European and American conc·erns 
are also seriously considering starting automotive op~ 
erations in the very near future. The new President of 
Brazil, Juscelino Kubitschek, is responsible for this 
i~ 49, PP• 58. 
*'!~ 47 
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sudden expansion of Brazil's automotive industry. As 
a part of the new economic 'development program, his 
administration issued two special orders which served 
as an inducement to internationally known automobile 
and truck manufacturers to undertake produ~tion in 
Brazil. The new methods enable foreign producers to 
cut through mountains of red tape which has been slow-
ing AOWn private enterprises, and to import capit~l 
equipment with a minimum of bureaucratic obstruction.* 
In view of Brazil's shortage of foreign cur-
rency, the government has been obliged to limit the im-
portation of all cars. The total number of automobiles 
in use in 1954 was only about 12% of the yearly produc-
tion of some six million cars in the United States (see 
Table V). A large percentage o~ the tru~ks in Brazil 
are old and probably considered unusable here in America. 
From personal experience, the writer has found that most 
of the trucks on the highway have a maximum speed of 
five to ten miles per hour on an upgrade. It is also a 
common sight to see disabled trucks lining the high-
ways; yet many industrial concerns depend on trucks as 
their sofue means of transportation. This is mainly be-
cause railroads and coastal shipping are in just as bad 
a state as the trucking industry, if not worse. 
* 40, PP• 24. 
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TABLE v. 
Motor Vehicles in Use - Brazil 
!948-1954 
(in thousands) 
Year Passen~er Commercial Total 
1948 169 157 326 
1949 193 .182 375 
1950 200 198 398 
1951 263 226 489 
1952 300 265 565 
1953 338 312 650 
1954 368 352 720 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1955; United Nations; 
Page 324. 
Because of import restrictions, foreign auto-
mobile3producers were confronted with the choioe of ship• 
. ' 
ping little or nothing to the Brazilian market, or of 
transferring capital equipment to produce vehicles 
directly in Brazil. Apparently several American and 
European companies have chosen the latter course by . 
their decision to set up new plants and assembly lines 
for the production of automobiles and trucks. -it-
~~ 46, PP• 24. 
According to some statistics, there are 
roads in Brazil leading almost anywhere in the country. 
One important detail that these statistics often do not 
mention is the condition of these roads. 4~ In l9l?2, 
official Brazilian statistics showed a total of 212,325 
miles of highway. Out or these, so% were dirt roads, 
byways and mud tracks impassable during the rainy sea-
son. Furthermore, almost all of the paved highways are 
located in the state of Sao Paulo and along the coast 
to Rio de Janeiro. This is one of the main reasons why 
Sao Paulo is the richest and best-developed state in 
Brazil • .JHf-
Several wears ago, Brazil's highway department 
started a twenty-year program calling for the construc-
tion and maintenance of 30,000 miles of first-class 
highways. Funds for road building are usually derived 
from.taxes on imports or petroleum products and special 
congressional appropriations. It is stipulated that at 
least 20% of the income received from fuel taxes by the 
federal, state, and municipal governments must be spent 
on paving and improving roads. But sometimes the 
amounts spent by states and muni~ipalities are not 
* 25 
iHt- 21 
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sufficient even to keep the roads in their present 
condition, to say nothing of improving them. However, 
the Federal government realizes the importance of high-
ways and more appropriations are being approved for the 
buil.ding of roads. Loans are obtained from outside the 
country to help finance the cost. One of these loans 
for three million United States dollars, was secured in 
1953, from the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Developme~t. Part of this fund is being used to 
import highway construction equipment for which Brazil 
has a great need.* 
Up to very recently, Brazil had always given 
more emphasis to building cities, not realizing that 
good roads connecting them are needed to assure solid 
and healthy development of the potential and the re-
sources of the region.~H} However, since the death o:f 
President Vargas in 1954, the new administration has 
devoted itself to speeding up highway construction. 
But a good network of paved interstate highways is 
still only in the planning stage. 
2) Rai l:r:oads • 
The firs.t railroad in Brazil was bUilt over 
100 years ago by a private British concern. In ract, 
~~ 21 
~HI- 25 
so. 
the British had control over most of the large and im-
portant networks until within about eight years when 
they started to withdraw their ca-pi tal:n They sold most 
~} 
of the lines to the Federal government. At present, 
two-thirds of Brazil's railroads are owned and operated 
by the Federal gpvernment, and about 10~ belong to the 
states. Private companies now control only about 23% 
but this includes some of the most profitab~e lines which 
are located in the populous areas. For instance, the 
company Cia. Paulista de Estradas de Ferro, which 
operates one of the most modern and well~run railroads 
in the world, has paid a dividend to the stockholders 
~very_year since 1870. But this is an exception rather 
than the rule. 
Brazil now has about 23,000 miles of track, 
an extremely small amount for a countr,r of its size. 
Its railroad traffic is estimated to be only 1% of 
that of the United States'. Most of the tracks were 
laid before 1920, and since then the construction of new 
roads has lagged very badly. Only very recently has the 
government started a movement to re-equip, rehabilitate, 
and extend the ramlroad network, realizing that a good 
railroad system is imperative to the future economic 
~~ 60, PP• 51. 
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development of the countl?y.~F It is, at present, im-
possible to attract private capital either foreign or 
domestic, into this field. This situation is mostly 
due to the large capital investment necessary, and the 
fact that most of the existing railroads in Brazil are 
unprofitable. In the past, the government has .always 
kept the freight rates low, with the intention of check-
ing inflation. This alone, of course, could not keep 
prices down, but did ruin the financial position of most 
of the rail companies as cost of wages, material, and 
equipments rose, Therefore, railroads in Brazil, with 
very few exceptions, have long operated in the red. 
Because of this poor financial position, most companies, 
both public and private, do not have the necessary funds 
for the replacement of equ~pment. At the present time, 
most of the rqlling stock in use is of an earlier era. 
According to a study made in 1945, over 50% of the loco~ 
motives in use were more than thirty years old. Prac-
tically all of them had deteriorated beyond a condition 
for giving efficient service, and some of them could be 
considered scrap. 4M} Of course, pwchases have been made 
since then, but they are few. 
* 12, PP• 48-49. 
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Brazil traditionally has had trouble in pur-
chasing railroad equipment even when capital is avail-
able. There are three different types of gauges in 
use, and none of them corresponds mth that of the 
United States and t~e United Kingdom, the leading pro-
'' 
ducers of railroad equipment. Large additional costs 
have to be paid for special wheels, rolling stock and 
various other minor changes. Of the three gauges, 
90% are of the one-meter type, which is narrower than 
the standard u. s. Gauge (1.44 meter), 7% are broad 
gauge (1.60 meters), and 3% are narrow gauges (0.76, 
0.@6, 0.60 meters). Many of the lines have three 
par~llel tracks ins~ead of the usual two, thereby 
adapting themselves to two different gauges. However, 
~assengers and cargos still have to be shifted very 
often, which results in costly and very wasteful op-
erations. The non-existence of a standard gauge is 
really one of the greatest hinderances to the efficient· 
operation of the Brazilian railroad system. 
Fuel also has long been a problem to the 
.Brazilian railroads. It amounts to approximately 20% 
of the operating expense as compared with 7i% in the 
United States; Coal, which is the principal fuel used, 
* 4, PP• 193-194. 
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has to be imported, because domestic coals are of low 
quality and are not suitable for railroad operation. 
In the interior, wood is often used, but the location 
o~ the source makes the fuel quite expensive. Recent~ 
a small portion of the lines have been electrif·ied. 
This will reduce the dependence on imported fuel, but 
electri~ication is costly and uneconomical except in 
areas where traffic is heavy and abundant electrical 
* power available. . Diesels have been replacing some of 
the old-fashioned steam locomoti ve·s, but diesel fuel 
also has to be imported. 
Ex~sting emergency requirements of the 
Brazilian railway program may be outlined as follows: 
(1) There is an immediate nee·d for new locomotives, cars, 
rails, ties, and a modern signaling system to replace ~he 
ancient equipment. (2) Standardizati9n of gauges in 
railroad tracks, operation, and administrative reorgan-
ization and regrouping (especially those railllroad com-
panies under Federal government control) is necessary. 
At the present time, government-owned railroads are 
under several di~ferent types of organizations; com-
plete unification under one administration must be 
* 4, PP• 194-195. 
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established before any real progress can be made. (3} 
Construction of interconnections and new lines must 
begin."~ 
Most of Brazil's railroad systems are heavily 
concentrated in the south and central zones of the 
country along the coast. There are no through-lines 
connecting the whole length of Brazil from north to 
soubh or going deep into the interior. Trips can be 
made only by chan~ing trains at various c_onnecti'qg 
points. The government has a National Railroad Plan 
that envisages the construction of standard-gauge main 
lines ~onnecting the large cities. 100-million dollar 
loap was granted by the Export Import Bank in 1956 for 
thi.s purpose. However, the full realization of this 
plan will. take a very long time.** 
From a consumer viewpoin.t, the railroad 
transportation is comparatively cheaper than that of 
the highway. This is because trucks are extremeiy~ex­
pensive, and their useful life is very short when used 
on Brazilian highways. Furthermore, the freight rates 
for trucks are not regulated by the ~ov~rnment. How-
ever, it must be recognized that railroad facilities 
?t- 4, pp. 188. 
?~f.~r53, PP. 24. 
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are not available in many places away from the coast. 
The service they provide is far from rapid or efficient. 
3) Coastal Shipping. 
Brazil's coastal shipping industry is, if any-
thing, in a worse condition than its trucking industry 
or the railroads. The largest company is a governme~t~ _ 
owned organization named Lloyd Brasileiro. Statistics 
for 1946 show that it carried 25% Gf the total trade. 
... "' ~ . . 
The second place was occupied by a private company, ·with 
18%. This was followed by two more official compan~~s 
which took 23% of the trade. Of these two, the Ci~. 
Siderurgica Nacional (The National St.eel Company) used 
its ships primarily for the transportation of coal ~or 
. -
the steel mill at Volta Redonda. The rest of the trade 
was carried on by several small companies. 
Coastwise shipping, according to the 1946 Constitu• 
tion, is limited to national ships, ~xcept in the case 
of public necessities. The owners, charterers, com-
manders, and two-thirds of the crew of these national 
'ships must all be citizens of Brazil. National ships 
are defined as ships belonging to native-born Brazilians 
or to companies organized in Brazil with more than one-
balf of the capital belonging to native-born Brazilians. 
All of these rules and regulations make heavy foreign 
investment in this field extremely difficult. 
66,. 
All shipping matters are controlled by the 
Merc~nt Marine Commission (Conmissao de Marinha Mercante) 
which was established in 1941, with three commissioners 
appointed by the President. The Ministry of Transport 
and Public Works also has some authority in coastwise. 
shipping; but the routes, rates, and subsidies are de-
termined by the Commission. 
The Lloyd Brasileiro was first formed as 
early as 1890. The Federal government took over the 
company entirely in 1937, but at that time it already 
owned most of the stock. Since then it has been ad-
ministered ~s a semi-autonomous organization with a 
yearly subsidy from the Federal government. It is 
required, however, to carry the mail free, and to grant 
a reduction in price for government passengers and 
~reight. The Company traditionally operates not only 
along the coast but gives river and international ser-
vice as well. At the end of the Second World War, 
Lloyd had a fleet of sixty-nine ships, amounting to 
262,000 tons. But since then, it has been on a limited 
expansion program. Orders have been given to the United 
States Maritime Commission for surplus freighters, and 
orders for new ships have been placed with the United 
States and Canadian shipbuilding concerns. The comple-
tion of this expansion program will see Lloyd about 
double its postwar tonnage. Most of the funds to finance 
thase new purchases have come from the Export Import 
Bank, which has long assisted Brazil in important pro-
jects vital to the national economy.* 
TABLE VI. 
Merchant Shipping Fleets - Brazil 
194'7-1954 
(in thousand gross registered tons) 
Year Tonnage 
1947 603 
1948 706 
1949 722 
1~50 698 
1951 688 
1952 794 
1953 854 
1954 895 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1955; United Nations; 
Page 327 
From these statistics it is seen that the 
mercP.ant-marine fleet in Brazil ha~ shown a very slow 
expansion. This is due mostly to the unprofitability 
for private investors, the limitation on foreign capital 
68. 
and the lack of government funds. Brazil, however, 
does have the second ~argest fleet in Latin-America, a 
close. second to that of Argentina. But compared with 
the United States, its 895,000 tons is only about a 
little more th~n 3~ of the United States' total of 
27, 3.44, 000 tons. 
Brazil, at present, has no real ship-
building facilities. Only some 100-· or 2oo ... ton Diesel-
sail fishing boats and coastal luggers are built domes-
tically. Maintenance equipment and facilities are also 
lacking. Repairs are mostly don~ in the Naval yar.rl and 
the Costeira yard, both located near Rio de Janeiro.~" 
However, there are plans for having a Japanese group 
invest in a shipbuilding yard in Brazil. 
New ships have recently been received, and 
steps have been taken to improve the harbors and dock 
facilities. These· moves constitute the beginning of a 
shipping service more in keeping with the need of com-
merce, along Brazil's extensive waterways. However, a 
great deal still has to be done before coastwise ship-
ping can be considered an efficient and cheap form of 
transportation. At present, delays, high charge and 
interest tax, vexation taxes, and losses from pilferage 
i~ 4, pp • 213 • 
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and damage still remain as serious handicaps to coastal 
shipping in interstate traffic. 
In the near future, the government will con-
centrate on building and improving the coastal fleet 
rather than the international merchant fleet. It 
recognizes that the country does not have the capital, 
manpower and metallurgical industries and skills to 
develop an international fleet. Furthermore, the tra~ 
portation problem at home appears more important, and 
should be g'iven priority. -af. 
River transportation can also play an import-
ant role in the transportation system. rt has been 
neglected in the past but is due for some serious con~ 
sideration. Brazil has more than 25,000 miles of navi-
gable waterways, but over 15,000 miles are in the Amazon 
Basin. A large portion of the rest is also located in 
rather undeveloped regions. The Federal government a~b­
sidizes many private companies in this field, and also 
controls some vessels. The principal federally con-
trolled river service is the Servicao do Navigacao e de 
Administracao do Porto do Para (SNAPP), which serves 
the Amazon River and some of its tributaries• In addi· 
tion to the activities of the Federal g0vernment, several 
* 4, PP• 212~215. 
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states also grant subsidies and operate vessels. Most 
of the equipment in use is very old, but e~forts are 
being made to recondition it. Current appropriations, 
however, are very small and usually so dispersed that 
. ~~ little is accomplished at any one time.· 
Brazil, with its three million square miles 
of area, has not yet obtained a fair solution of its 
transportation problems. It cannot be denied that much 
has already been accomplished, but the facilities in 
maritime, railway, and river transportation are still 
inadequate. 
B) Fuel and Power 
1) The Petroleum Industry in Brazil. 
In the past years, the increase in the output 
of crude petroleum has been less than the growth in con-
sumption of its derivatives. Fuel imports in Brazil 
have expanded much faster than the capacity to import, 
thus exerting considerable pressure on th~ balance 0f 
..~~~~ payments.· Moreover, fuel purchases have been made at 
the expense of capital-good imports essential for ac-
celerating economic development. Petroleum products 
have traditionally been the largest drain on Brazil's 
* 4• PP• 212-215. 
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foreign-exchange re~ources, but recently they have be-
com~ an alarming portion of the total imports. 
Years 
1934-38 
1946-50 
1951-53 
1954 
1955 
TABLE VII~ 
Incid~nce of Fuels on the Values 
of All Imports in Brazil 
(in percentages) 
Percent 
12.4 
10.5 
12.8 
18.7 
21.7 
t 
Source: Economic Survey of Latin-America 1955; United 
Natio~s; Page 90, Table 85. 
The petroleum industr,r in Brazil has long 
been· a government monopoly. It started in 1938, when 
a decree-law created the National Petroleum Goun9il ~ 
(Consejo Nacional de Petroleo). The first producing well 
was located in Bahia, but daily production w~s limited 
to only a few quarts of petroleum. The Couneil also in" 
stalled a couple of very small refineries during World 
War II; but on the whole, the petroleum industry, in the 
hands of the government, has not kept up with the 
national demands. Bahia has remained the only petroleum-
producing ~rea, though it has been proved quite 
'72. 
satisfactorily that oil exists in many other regions 
throughout the country .:~f. 
In 1953, a new organization entitled Petroleo 
Brasileiro, S.A. {known as Petrobras) was ~ormed3 and 
took over the National Petroleum Council's assets with 
additional capital. ~H~ This state entity was given the 
monopoly in oil exploration, pro~uction, anp erection 
of new refineries; and only in the refining and distri-
bution of by-products are private companies permitted 
to continue their activities. The Federal government 
owns and controls the majority of the shares in Petrobras, 
but private nattonals or national entities oan-investdn 
this organization. Foreign capital, however, is not per-
mitted to participate. Economic nationalism, although 
outmoded by circumstances and contrary to all the 
tendencies of the modern world, still remains a power-
ful political force in Brazil. Petrobras is regarded 
as its standard bearer, and in the 1955 p'residential 
election, no candidate advocated the changing of this 
monopolistic character:~Kf-~} 
4t- 4, PP• 147-149. 
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Petrobras receives a large regular income from 
a variety of sources. At its start, it was endowed 
with the part of the revenue receipts from taxes on 
liquid fuels and import and excise duties on motor 
vehicles. Also it obtains funds from the compulsory 
levy on owners of transports, who in return~receive 
non-voting stocks of Petrobras. Beside this, Petrobras 
is entitled to receive 5% of the foreign exchange ear.n-
ed by Brazilian exports of all kinds, and four~fifths 
of the foreign exchange saved through the operations of 
the refineries in Brazil. Since its start, and up to 
the end of 1955, it has received foreign currency 
equivalent to about 60 million United States dollars 
from this source alone. Petrobras also has borrowing 
powers and receives ,some investments from private 
national interests. The annual income is very sub-
stantial, but by no means too large for the task of 
developing current production~ exploration and expan-
sion and construction of refineries. 
In 1955, Petrobras struck oil at Nova Olinda 
in the Amazon Basin. The commercial value of this·dis-
covery does not appear to be very great, but it does 
give positive proof of the existence of oil in the 
hinterlands of Amazonia. However, Nova Olinds is some 
2,000 miles,away from the seaboard; and the·investment 
of much more money is needed before aqy oil can flow to-
wards the coast. 
Besides its main effort in oil drilling in 
the Amazon region, Petrobras is continuing the develop-
ment and exploration of the Bahia fields. Exploratory 
drilling is starting in the North Central coastal states 
of Maranhao and Rio Grande de Norte. Geophysical 
surveys are being carried out in the states of Algoas 
and Sergipe. In all this work, Petrobras receives 
help from foreign technicians on its own staff and from 
foreign contractors .. .J~ 
Brazil's crude-petroleum production did not 
start until about 1940. Since the end of the War, it 
has increased very rapidly, but it is still so small 
that only 14~ of the country's consumption is from the 
domestic source. 
TABIE VIII~ 
Crude Petroleum Production - Brazil 
1940-1954 
(~n thousand metric tons) 
Year Production Year Production 
1:940 
1941 
0.3 
0.4 
* 14,pp. 20-21. 
1942 
1943 
4.3 
6.3 
75. 
TABLE VIII. (cont.) 
Year Production Year Production 
1944 7.5 1950 44.3 
1945 10.4 1951 90.3 
1946 8.7 1952 98.1 
1947 12.6 1953 119.7 
1948 18.7 1954 129.7 
1949 14.3 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1955; United Nations 
Page 143 
' . 
To-demonstrate Brazil's shortage of crude petroleum 
further, its 1954 production was only about 0.~3% of 
that o£ ~atin-America's leading producer, Venezuela. 
Compared with the United States' total o£ 313 million 
metric tons, Brazil was producing only 0 1 04~ of this < 
total. 
In the past years, Petrobras has spent m0re 
money on refineries than on the extraction of crude oil. 
The increase in refining capacity, although imported 
crude oil is used, does save considerable sums of for-
eign exchange. The building cost of a refinery can 
usually be amortized in three or four years through 
these savings. For example: three refineries in Brazil -
Presidents Bernandes, Capauva, and Maragunhao ~ have a 
capacity of three-and-a-half million cubic meters of 
76. 
crude oil a yea:r. The valu·e of this crud·e oil is 70.5 
million U. s. dollars. If Brazil has to import the 
derivatives made from this crude oil, it will cost 
87.2 million dollars. So the gross saving in exchange 
is 16.7 million a year, while the external commitments 
in.building the refineries are only about 60 million 
-dollars. ~t-
In 1956, Brazil's refineries were able to meet 
almost all of the country's' gasol~ne needs and about 
half of its fuel-oil needs. But aviation gasol1ne and 
most of the kerosene, gas/diesel oil, and lubricants 
' I 
consumed must still be imported. In the past year, 
gasoline demands have risen only very slightly, because 
of the tight restriction on the ~mportation of motor 
vehicles. But fuel.-oil demands have been increasing at 
a fast pace because of the ~stablishment of various 
new industries·and thermal power stations. New re-
fineries are constantly being,built and present facili-
ties expanded, to meet the ever-increasing demand for 
petroleum products. ~t-
Most of the refineries in Brazil are located 
at various seaports along the coast, since almost all 
~t- 59, PP• 90. 
~B:O 14, pp • 20-21. 
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of the crude oil used is imported.' As is to be expected, 
the Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo ar.~as contain well over 
r 
50% of the co~tny's total refining capaci~. A new 
small refinery is now being built in the interior at 
Manuas, the largest inland city along the Amazon River. 
Its schedule is to process crude oil broughtdown the 
river from the Eastern Peru and Venezuela oil fields. 
This eventually will also work with oil from the new 
Nova Olinda fi~lds. 
Brazil is a vast undeveloped country. There 
is no doubt that her po±ential wealth is enormous; but 
by herself, she is unable to provide all the capital 
resources needed for her development. Foreign invest-
ments, accompanied by imported technical skill, will~ 
play an important role in Brazil's growth. The present 
administration must decide sooner or later whether to 
continue its economic nationalism in regard to oil, or 
to open up the vast hinterlands and let foreign concerns 
in for exploration. When President Kubitschek toGk 
office in 1956, leading American and British oil com• 
panies - including Standard, Texas, Gulf and Shell ~ 
i 
were hopeful of a change in policy. The President 
announced he would give Petrobras six months to demon• 
strate what it cou~d do• ~he six months have now gone 
by, and the foreign companies are still only allowed 
78. 
to dis tribute the oil which they import into Brazil·.. It 
seems that the nationalist sentiment within the army 
{t-
and the public has again prevailed. 
2) Hydroelectric, Thermal, and Atomic Power Sources. 
During the post-war period, the energy-
consumption pattern in Brazil has been a steady, rapid 
increase in the use of electric power, and a gradual 
replacement of mineral, coal, and vegetable fuels by 
petroleum der.ivitives. Electrical energy has risen 
considerably within this period, but shortages exist 
in many cases. However, in the year 1954 and 1955, 
the supply improved slightly in areas where it pre-
viously had been inadequate. In the near future, the 
outlook is for the rapid growth of demand. Retrogres-
sion is to be feared unless new and greater e~forts are 
made to expand the installed capacity of electric power 
plants .~t:-1~ 
{~ 32' pp • 23. 
~Ht-59, PP• 78e 
TABLE IX. 
Electric Energy Installed Capacity - Brazil 
1949-1955 
(in thousand KW) 
Year Total Hydro Percentage 
in H:;rdro (in ~) 
1949 1,735 1,431 82.5 
1950 1,883 1,536 81.5. 
1~51 1,940 1,585 81.7 
1952 1,985 1,598 80.5 
1953 2,104 1,686 80.1 
1954 2,805 2,173 77.5 
1955 3,065~~ -iH} 
Sdurce: Statistical Yearbook 1955; United Nations; 
Page 277 
* - 1955 figure from Economic Survey of Latin America 
1955J United Nations; Page 87; Table 83 
~H~- Hydro figure for 1955 not available. 
Brazil ranks high among the nations of the 
world (after Russia, United States, and Canada) in 
water-power potential, but very low on the list in in-
stalled capacity. The total hydro-electric potential is 
-
estimated at about 14 million kw., or 19 million horse-
~" 1 at power; but according to 1954 statistics, only 61o of 
this potential is being utilized. The location of the 
hydrographic basins, and the lack of capital resources 
are the two main reasons for the small installed capacity. 
* 4,pp. 152-154. 
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TABLE X. 
Hydralic Potential in Brazil by State 
(in KW) 
State Hydralic Potential 
Acre --------
Algoas 173,850 
Amazonas 93,862 
Amapa 86,114 
Bahia 899,412 
Ceara 368 
Distrito Federal 
{City of Rio de Janeiro) 441 
Espirito Santo 73,015 
Goias 816,323 
Guappre 1,008,233 
Maranhao 33,603 
Mato Grasso 894,853 
Min~s Gerais 4,285,000 
Para. 1,293,596 
Paraiba 1,176 
Parana li906,250 
Pernambuco· 33,823 
Piaui 8,4p6 
Rio Branco 105,704 
Rio de Janeiro 399,720 
Rio Grande do Norte -------
State 
Rio Grande do Sul 
Santa Catarina 
Sao Paulo 
Sergipe 
Total 
TABLE X. (cont.) 
Hydralic Potential 
180,368 
114,560 
1,912,947 
588 
13,992,539 
Source: Brazil An Expanding Economy; Wythe, George; 
Wight, Royce A.; Midkiff, Harold M.; 1949; 
Page 115 
Of all the hydroelectric installations in 
Brazil, nearly half are in the State of Sao Paulo* The 
three states - Sao Paulo, Rio de ~aneiro, and Minas 
Gerais - have approximately 90% of the total installa-
tiona in the coun~ry. In thermoelectric power, Rio 
Grande do Sul is in the lead because of her coal re-· 
sources, but is followed closely by Pernambuco, Rio 
de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo. * 
In the Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo area, the 
sou~ces of bydro-e~ ctric energy are becoming exhausted, 
especially in the densely populated areas. Inadequate 
rainfall has often affected energy supplies by reducing 
the level of the water in hydro-electric res~rvoirs. 
This factor emphasizes the desirability of improving 
~~ 4, PP• 154. 
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and stabilizing the hydro-electric potential by regulat-
ing water courses, building compensatory reservoirs, and 
interconnecting (as far as possible) zones with different 
rainy or thawing seasons. Very little has been done in 
this field, although plans are being made to remedy 
this situation. A:t· the present time, there is still 
a big shortage in this area, which has resulted in 
rationing at various i·ntervals. As all the new plants 
and industries that are being built go into operation, 
the serious problem of a shortage of electricity will 
~t: increase in magnitude.' 
In the State of Minas Gerais, the situation 
is. a little different. It is true that a shortage of 
power also exists, but the State contains by far the 
largest hydro-electric potential in Brazil. Min~· 
Gerais has recently established State action in the 
development of the electrical industry. Several mixed-
capital corporations (State and private) controlled by 
a holding company, the Gentrais Electricas de Minas 
Gerais, S.A. (GEMIG) have been organized. An electri-
fication tax, which amounts to 0.4% of the· total 
volume of sales m. d business transactions in the State, 
supplies mos.t of the capital for CEMIG. Private 
capital from industries in the ~rea, and loans from 
Banco Nacional de Resonvolvimento Economico and 
~} 59, PP• 86 ... 88 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
have all assisted in financing CEMIG projects. In the 
five years from 1950·1955, the electric-energy-growth 
rate in the State was 12% per annum compounded. There 
is no evidence to suggest that this rate will slacken 
in the next ten years. On the contrary, there is evi~ 
dence that the pace will be accelerated to meet the 
,, 
~· rapidly expanding industrial development.~ 
Hydro-eJe ctric power generation, according tb 
the 1934 and 1937 constitutions, was limited to 
Brazilian nationals, except with respect to investments 
already made. A law subsequently relaxed this restric-
tion by permitting ~ew foreign investments in this 
industry at the government's discretion. The 1946 
constitution au~horized the granting of concessions 
. 
for the production of hydro-electric esergy to foreign 
concerns established under Brazilian laws, as well as 
~H' to Brazilian nationals.'''" 
The bulk of the power industry 'in Brazil is owned 
I 
and operated by foreign concerns. Two large enterprises-
The Brazilian Traction, Light, and Power Company, Ltd., 
of Toronto, Canada, and subsidiaries of the American and 
Foreign Power Company of New York - generate and 
* 10, PP• 78-81. 
~~~~- 60, PP• 57. 
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distribute close to three-quarters of the total power 
produced in Brazil. The utility rates charged by the 
power indus try are determined and regula ted by the 
Brazilian Government. The post-war rise in prices and 
costs did not bring a corresponding increase in utility 
rates. This resulted in a decline in the yield; but 
several public-utility enterprises have arranged with 
the government for a "gold clausen in their franchise, 
linking utility rates with the.exchange rate of the 
cruzeiros. For example; the Brazilian subsidiaries of 
the American and Foreign Power Company obtained an 
agreement that half of its rates charged to the customer 
should be allowed to fluctuate inversely with the ex-
change value of Brazilian currency (in terms of dollars). 
In practice, arrangements of this type have been of 
little effect,· owing to the popular resistance to a 
change of utility rates.~}-
Owing to this particular ~ituation, the for- · 
eign concerns have not invested new capital as extensively 
as the requirements of the country call for. The 
Brazilian government, recognizing this situation, is 
starting to aid in the development of the power in-
dustry. In the latter p~ of 1954, a Federal Electri-
fication Fund was established to promote and finance the 
* 60, PP• 57-60. 
85. 
·' 
production, transmission, and distribution of electric 
p0wer, as well as the development of an electrical-
equipment industry. The assets of this Federal fund 
are to come from 60% of the proceeds of a tax on 
light and power consumption, 20% of the proceeds of a 
tax on foreign-exchange remittances, and specific annual 
appropriations in the Federal Budget during, the next 
ten years. The program for establishing a National 
Electrification Plan and creating a corporation called 
Centrals Electrcais Brasileiro, S.A. (Electrobras) has 
been initiated. Operation of the Electrobras will be 
restricted to construction of electric power generating 
plants and high-tension transmission lines, together 
with the creation of a heavy industry for the manu-
facture of electrical material "if private initiative 
is not interested therein." Although the name of 
Electrobras bears.a close resemblance to Petrobras, it 
will not be a monopoly. In fact, the government has 
worked with private concerns, both foreign and domestic 
~f in the development oft he power industry.' 
Before the establishment and operation of the 
national agency provided for in the electrification plan, 
autonomous regional groups were responsible for public 
-$f. 63, PP• 10. 
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investment in thia sector of the industry. State 
enterprises like those in Minas perais, Rio.Grande do 
Sul, Esperito Santo, Bahia, etc., are constructing new 
plants. By the end of 1955, 420,000 KW were being in• 
stalled. Some groups are exploiting specific resources. 
One such group, the Government-owned Sao Francisco 
Hydroelectric Company, with the Paulo Alfonso plant on 
the Sao Francisco River, is currently the largest pro-
ject undertaken.~} When fully completed, it wi 11; have 
an installed capacity of close to a million KW and will 
open up a field ~or new industrial developments in the 
eight northeastern states along the coast.~~?} 
Private ~oreign capital, although less en-
thusiastic over new investments, has announced de-
velopment plans which will make it an important 
nucleus in the power ~ield. A small percentage of the 
total investment has come from domestic sources and 
small municipalities. Despite financing difficulties 
which usually beset this type o~ enterprice, their 
efforts in relative terms have been significant. 
Nuclear power can offer Brazil a solution 
to the power-shortage problem. Although Brazil has a 
~} 59' pp • 93. 
~~ 63, pp. 10. 
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large·. hydro~electric power potential, as mentioned 
before, the locations make it difficult and uneconomical 
to exploit it. Even if it were fully utilized, the 
available power per capita would ~ot exceed one twenty-
fifth of that consumed at the present time in the United 
, 
States. The economic utilization of thermal-electric 
power plants using diesel oil or coal cannot be con-
sidered as a s elution to the power problem. The pro-
duction and refining of petroleum is still in its in~ 
fancy, and coal reserves located in the Southern Coastal 
region are relatively small and of low quality. 
The existence in Brazil of large deposits of 
urani~ and thorium offers enormous possibilities for 
the solution of the problem through the u~e of atomic 
energy. A systematic prospecting program has been 
under way for some years n.ow, and important deposits 
of atomic raw material have been found in areas where 
their existence was previously unsuspected. Accoraing 
to conservative estimates, known and proven reserves of 
Uranium and thorium are sufficient to meet the country's 
requirsments for power of all kinds for the next 200 
years. Brazil already.has plants for the extraction 
and processing of the atomic ores, as well as a plant 
to produce nuclearly pure uranium and thorium.{f-
-lf 13, PP• 43. 
88. 
The availability of raw material, pius the 
. 
low maintenance cost, will enable nuclear power to com-
pete successfully, even at the present time, with thermal-
electric power plants in a large section of the country, 
and in some cases with hyd~o-electric plant~. The 
hinderances are: large capital investments. are re" 
quired as well as resources in the field of atomic re~ 
search also a very limited number of personnel has 
experience in the nuclear field. However, the train-· 
ing and study programs sponsored by the Atomic Energy 
Commission and the National Research Council should 
partly remedy the personnel deficiency within the next 
few years. Brazil also hopes to be ab~e to count on 
the coope~ation and assistance of technicians and 
scientists from other countries.* 
The American and Foreign Power Company has 
recently released plans to build a nuclear power plant 
for its subsidiary in ~razil. It is a part of Foreign 
Power's £ive-year expansion program, costing about 250 
ID.ill\On n.olls:rs.~.t- ~ According to an official of the 
thiS e.to 'c reactor will have a c·apaci ty of 
Company, 
The si chosen for this nuclear power plant 
10,000 KW• 
* 13, PP• 43 • 
51. .,;.m • 6 6 • *~ ' .k"'.t" 
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is Niteroi, a city across the Guanbara Bay from Rio de 
Janeiro. Withmost of its preliminary engineering 
already completed, the Company will begin construction 
of the boiling water reactor within a year. The schedu~ 
calls for the generation of power in 1959. It will be 
the first industrial atomic plant in South America, and 
certainly the first step to power :-~Brazil by atomic 
* energy .• 
The out.look in the power field, however, is 
still not bright. The combined efforts of the Brazilian 
Government and foreign and private concerns have given 
the field some very sizeable investments. But industrial-
ization in Brazil is progressing at.an extremely rapid 
rate. The nation is facing a power hunger that may re~ 
sult in an economic crisis, particularly in the industrial 
areas of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais. 
on February 25, 1957, President Kubitschek 
a~~roved~lans for a large dam and power complex to be 
known as Furnas, on ·the Rio Grande River, which se-
~ 
8 
sao Paulo and Minas Gerais. It is planned to 
ps.ra"'e 
A r ica's largest power center, eventually gen~ be Latin me 
then c'(le million kilowatts and serving en 
ere.ting more .\ -
~~llion people, or one-third of 
inhe.bi ted b-y \1 are~ ), 
~~ 51., 1?1?. 1.'7. 
the Brazilian population. This project will be another 
example of a combined effort between the Brazilian 
government m d private organizations which the present 
administration is trying to encourage in the place of 
exclusive state monopolies, which eventually may lead 
the~country into state capitalism or state socialism. 
, 51% of the total cost of Fernas will be borne by the 
government, an~ the balance by the Brazilian Tractio~, 
Light and Power Company, Ltd., o~ Toronto, Canada. 
The E1port-Import Bank is expected to lend about 95 
million u. s. dollars, which would be the largest power 
loan to any Latin"American country. The race is on in 
Brazil, to avert an economic crisis due to power 
shortage. -it-
C) Sales 
l) Population Factors. 
Because of the nature of the product and the 
inadequacy of transportation facilities in Brazil, the 
market coverage of a cement mill is extremely limited. 
Therefore, it is necessary to plan the mill where the 
demand is located. In a discussion about the principal 
t i n Brazil, we shall have to ex-market area for cemen • 
emin~ the area s of population concentration. 
J 
=·--zaer em 
91. 
= 
B azil is, by far, the most heavily populated 
country in outh America; in fact, it about equals the 
nine other outh American republics combined. The latest 
esti~ated f·gures place the total population at about 
60 million the end of 1955. The age distribution of 
the azili population, which is one of the youngest 
• 
impo tant country, indicates that the rapid 
grow h started in the 1930 1s, will continue for 
some time. see Fig. V) However, the number of residents 
is still * 11 in relation to its vast territory.· -~ 
T ere are three principal areas·of population 
trati n, all located along the coast. The first 
is i the S utheast, chiefly at the cities of Rio ae~ 
o and Sao Paulo, but embracing the states of Rio 
de J eiro, Sao Paulo, and Minas Gerais. The second 
area is the Northeast, from the Bay of Todos Os Santos 
(.Bahia~· nor h to Natal. This part was the first section 
to be settl d in Brazil on an important seale. Although 
continued to gain in population, the in-
has een much less than in other centers. The 
thiP cente of concent~ation is in the states of Santa 
Rio Grande do Sul, with the largest cluster 
at P re, the capital of the latter state. Located 
92. 
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Figure VI 
BRAZIL POPULATION DENSITY BY STATES 1950 
(per square mile) 
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The Develop~nt of Brazil; Report of Joint Brazil-
u~~. Economic Development Commission; Institute of 
Inte~-American Affairs; Foreign Operations Admin-
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at t~e head of Lagoas dos Patos, Porto Alegre is an 
impoJitant seaport which is becoming an industrial 
'It-
center. ~During recent years, especially in the past 
deca le, Brazil has been e~eriencing mass internal 
migr Industrial growth in Sao Paulo, and agri-
cult al developments in Western Sao Pauls, Northern 
Pana a, Southern Mato Grasso and Goias have attracted 
larg masses of population from the Northeast, which 
has ~een stagnant in its growth, having only limite4 
oppoJtunities. Large-scale migration has been tradi~ 
tion lly important in Brazilian history, making the.whole 
quite flexible and adaptable .~~A-
Of these three population centers, the Sao 
Paul - Rio - Minas Gerais are~is e~perien~ing the 
fa~t st growth in the number of inhabitants. This has 
resulted in a construction boom never before'~xper~enced 
in tJe history of Brazil. The building of new industrial 
plan1s, apartments, houses, highways and power dams is 
procteding at a rapid rate. Private building activity, 
whic~ represented 16% of the total gross:~investment and 
20% Jf the gross private investment in 1939 represented 
by 1J47, no less than 40% of the total gross investment 
~~ 4 PP• 14-16. 
iH} 6 , PP• 11. 
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I 
and 4 % of the gross private investment. More than 60% 
of al this private building is concentrated in the Federal 
Distr ct (City of Rio de Janeiro) and in Sao Paulo. ~•· 
There is no doubt that this area has the best cement 
in Brazil. 
) Transportation of Finished Goods·. , 
The transportation problem in Brazil is the 
main eason why the mill site whould be located near the 
market.and the principal raw materials. As mentioned 
prev1
1
ously in the section concerning transportation, 
the slao Paulo - Rio - Minas Gerais area is able to offer 
the best available facilities for transportation. Ten 
stat with the ~bove-mentioned three ~ading the list, 
acco nt for 70% of the total highway and railroad mile-
age n Brazil. ·lf·* 
If the plant locale is along the coast, mari-
time transportation may be utilized. It offers a cheaper 
form of conveyance which might permit the market coverage 
to b broadened. 
13) The Regional Income Distribution in Brazil .~': 
j In 1950, per-capita incomes in the various re-
gion~ of brazil were showing wide disparities. In order 
<~ 62 1 PP• 5, ~~ 3l, PP• 13• 
to lustrate the situation, Brazil is divided into 
and low income areas, depending on whether 
the er-capita income is more than 4,500 Cruzeiro (Cr.), 
out 2,500 Cr., or is less than 2,500 Cr. To get 
a ro the dollar equivalents of these figures, 
the arket rate during this period was apout thirt,r 
iros to one u. s. dollar. However, the expression 
of t e national income of one country in the currency 
of 
tude 
pari 
involves technical problems of such magni-
seriously affect the validity of any com-
Out of 52 fuillion people, in 1950, the h1gher-
area in Brazil contained a population of 17.8-
milllon. It includes: (1) the diversified agricultural 
and Important medium-sized industrial area of Rio Grande 
do S 1; (2) a new, rapidly expanding agricultural area, 
mainly on a new coffee rush, of Western Sao Paula 
and orthern Parana; (3) the industrial zone of Sao 
Pauli , which represents the most important and most rapidly 
gr-owling industrial center in Latin-America; and (4) the 
1 
Fedelral District (including the City of Rio de Janeiro}, 
which attracts wealth and talent from all nver the 
nation into commerce, banking, government, and other 
97. 
acti at the seat of Federal authority. The yearly 
per- apita income of this zone ranges from 4,600 Cr., in 
j 
Rto Jrande do Sul, to 7,500 Cr. in Sao Paulo and over 
13,6JO Cr. in the Federal District: The average figure 
for ,his area exceeds even that of some parts of Central 
Euro e • .,~ 
The middle-tncome area, with a 1950 population 
of a,out 13 million, has a per-capita income of about 
Cr., similar to that of Southeastern Europe. It 
(1) the prosperous medium-scale agricultural 
of Espirito Santo; {2) the important mining and 
trial region of Minas Gerais; (3) the southern part 
J 
e State of Mato Grasso, the result of an overflow 
e coffee and agricultural development boom in 
l' 
ern Parana and Western Sao Paulo; and ( 4-} the 
. 
sified European~type farm economy and coal~ 
g areas of Santa Ca~arina.~~~ 
The rest of Brazil, containing about 21 
mill!ion people in 1950, ~r 40% of the total population, 
witll per-capita incdmes varying from 1,200 Cr. in ~iaui 
to j out 2,400 Cr. in Pernambuco, and averaging about 
2,.010 Cr., comprises the lower-income area. This income 
* 6J, PP• 16-17. 
, -lH} E!2, PP• 17. 
t 
leve 
East 
zone 
the emi-arid northeastern states of Paraiba, Rio 
Gran, e. do Norte, and Ceara; ( 3) the "sertao", an area 
of P rnambuco, Bahia and Goias, which is dry and leaf-
less in the dry deason but green and lovely after the 
' 
, and (4) the immense tropical-forest and river 
ns of the Amazon Basin stretching from Maranhao 
e Peruvian, Colombian, Bolivian, and Venezuelan 
rs. 
The Read:ers, however, must be warned tliat in 
all he regions of Brazil there are wide differences 
come which reflect not only degrees of industrial-
iza ion and urbanization but the presence or absence 
of avorable soil and climatic conditions. Everywhere 
the e is a striking disparity between urban and rural 
lev ls of income and of living. As a general rule, 
wor~ers engaged in nonagricultural activities have a 
perilcapita income twice the amount of that of agricul-
_tur. 1 laborers in the same area. The difference lessens 
.!} 
as le move rrom the low to the high income zones.· 
* 62, PP• 1'7. 
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From the viewpoint of tne sales sector, the 
Sao aulo - Rio - Minas Gerais area offers the most ad-
geous location for a cement mill. 
n) eduction 
1) Raw Material and its Transportation. 
In the United States, cement-mill locations 
are ·ctated by raw-material supplie~. The economical 
ing radius is rarely more than 300 miles for most 
~~ 
e materials used in the manufacture of cement. 
the transportation system of the United States 
wit of Brazil, we can easily understand why a 
has to locate at the source of important 
raw , aterials in Brazil. Besides reasons of economy, 
it is impossible to transport over a long distance, 
tons of linestone, blast-furnace slags, or 
clays needed daily by an average cement mill. 
There are very few statistics available on the 
raw aterials used in the cement-making process. How-
eve , some statistics do exist for the limestone in-
100. 
dus 
is 
which supplies the pr.incipal raw material. Brazil 
endowed with this nonmetallic mineral, which 
can be easily found in many parts of the country. The 
lim stone mining industry has long been self-sufficient 
and s devoted almost entirely to domestic requirements. 
Most of the supply goes to the construction industry, 
* the · ement industry b.eing the second largest consumer. 
TABLE XI. 
D stribution of the Limestone Industry in Brazil 
Rio 
Par 
Tot 
by States, 1940 
~umber of Producing Percentage of 
units (in %) 
Gerais 244 15.4 
173 10.9 
140 8.9 
119 7.5 
do Norte 110 7.5 
¥ 
101 6.4 
695 43.9 
-· 
..,~' 
,J, 
' 
4 
1,582 100.0 
Mining·and Manufacturing Industry in Brazil; 
u.s. Tariff Commission; 1945; Page 31 
Total 
Most of the other raw materials can be found 
in arious parts of Braz~l. Some of the chemicals 
whi h are mixed in the c ement may have to be imported, 
b~t they are ~sed in very small quantities and it can 
be arranged for an impo~ter to supply the 
nee amounts. 
,pp. 39-32. 
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As far as raw materials are concerned, the 
choi e of a plant site must be n~ar a limestone or 
shel deposit, with clay or. shale close by. It is 
also desirable to have sand or sandstone available 
near y. Consideration should also be given to locat-
±fug~j ear. ~a .steal·umill, where blast furnace slag will 
adily obtainable. The ideal site, of course, 
contain all of these important raw materials, 
ote possibility, however. 
The choice of whether to use limestone or 
sea hells is an interesting facto~; Usually lime .... 
comes in big chunks requiring, therefore, more 
and eavier crushers. Oyster shells are smaller, need-
ing. herefore, fewer and lighter crushers. The use of 
r shells would not only save electr~c·al energy 
but apital investment as well.· However, shell deposits 
in 1large quanti ties are usually harder .to locate, and 
exist only near the coast. 
2) Fuel and Power. 
Both fuel and power are very important to the 
cem industry; and, as stated before, there are seri-
ous dificiencies of both in Brazil. Therefore, in· de· 
cid 
pow 
ava 
a plant site, it is necessary to investigate 
a large continuous supply of fuel oil are 
in the area. 
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In view of the power situation, it is very 
diff cult to find an area where there is no power 
shor~age. As in the ·CB:se' of the transportation system, 
the ~ower-generating facilities are concentrated in the 
I 
Sao ~aulo• Rio- Minas Gerais area. However, in the case 
of ·e~ectrical powe_r, the demand for it in this area is 
alsoj1greater than~ in any other part of the country. 
Neve 
1
theless, this section may still offer· the best 
poss~bili ties for power supply, since the lar.ges)t per-
cent~ge of .the total funds appropriated for the develop-
ment of the power industry is directed to this area. 
In the ca~e of the fuel supply, w.e find the 
same phenomenon in the concentration of oil refineries, 
name~y i_n Sao Paulo- Rio area. This ·southeastern 
coas~al section offers the best chance of obtaining the 
largj and steady quantity of fuel necessary for op-
erating a cement mill. 
3) Import Licensing Controls as They Affect 
t 
Importation of Cement Manufacturing E.quipment. 
Brazil has a unique and effective import con-
trol system. Since all of the equipment and machine~y 
of a cement mill must be imported, it is necessary to 
examine this system. 
I The system was 
It i, called the "AraiJ.ha 
l 
first initiated in October, 1953. 
Plan" because it was first pro-
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pose by Oswald Aranha who was then Minister of Finance. 
This control system allowed the importation of almost 
ever thing but in limited quantities, on the bas~s of 
open bidding at public exchange auctions for exchange 
comm tment certificates. A certificate entitles the 
owne to apply for an impo:;t license, which is necessary 
befo~e imports can be made. All the imports are classi-
fied in five categories, in order of their importance 
to t e country. The first three include all the essen-
tial items; the fourth includes semi-essential items; 
and 
in t 
category includes all items not s peoi~ied 
four cate.gories, i.e., those which are 
cons dered non-essential or luxury items. For an im-
port 
for 
the cost of exchange i~ his winning bid price 
exchange commitment certificate plus the offi-
CR., 
cial rate of exchange (t8.20Ato 1 u.s. dollar) with 
cert in taxes. The starting auction price gets pro-
gres ively htgher as the category moves from the essen • 
tial to the non-essential, thus making the importation 
of 1 ury goods extremely expensive. The minimum 
acce table bids are 25, 30, 35, 40, and 100 Cru~eiros 
to a dollar for the five categories. However, usually 
premiums are paid for these exchange commitment certi-
ficaJes: for example, the certificates auctioned off in 
Rio e Janeiro and Sao Paulo on November 22, 1955, 
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range from 67-70 to one dollar for the first category; 
80-89 for the second; 149-156 for the third; 200•201 for 
the f,urth; and 300-301 for the fifth. All these prices 
,_, 
fluctrate, depending on the supply and demand factors • • -r 
The s pply came from the total export rev.enue minus 
30% w ich is used by the government to meet its foreign 
tions. The rest is distributed tn the follo~ng 
Category 1 40% 
Category 2 30% 
Category 3 20% 
·cate~ory 4 18% 
Category 5 2% 
The available exchange for each category is 
distributed to various exchanges located at 
pal cities throughout the country, with Rio de 
o and Sao Paulo taking more than 50% of it. 
Aucti ns are held at the designated cities three times 
Most of the machinery, including cement-
oturing equipment is in the third category. 
~~ 69 1 PP• 2. 
-!HE- 23, PP• 7-9. 
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However, there is a rule governing the importation of 
certa"n capital equipment. If the foreign capital 
only 
dustries has ~een approved for registration by 
, the import license can be issued without the 
or t he exchange commitment c ertifi cates 
chinery, equipment and tools not manufactured in 
in sufficient quantities. If the proposed in-
nt is not to be registered, it can still apply 
council of SUMOC for an import license without 
• 
The council will grant such a license 
cases where it feels that the project is im-
to the national econom~. The cement industry 
and still is considered vital to the national 
But the granting of an import license without 
cover depends entir~ly on the council of SUMOC 
of each individual case.-!!< Judging from 
the w iter's personal experience in Brazil, it is im-
1 possi le to say whether or not such a license can be 
ed without actually trying. But. the important 
is tnat such a distinct possibility exists and 
be tried before the auction method is used. 
C: Superintendencia da Moeda e da Credito 
(Superintendancy of Money and Credi t..J} 
* 65, PP• 3-4. 
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There is absolutely no trouble in importing cement 
cturing equipment; the big difficulty lies in 
te of e~change. 
Another important point concerning the im-
ion of cement manufacturing equipment is the 
All imported goods are subject to an ~port 
duty, but certain exemptions are granted to l~dustries 
ered to be of primary importance to the entire 
Brazi1ian economy. These exemptions are ef~ective for 
od of five years from the date legislation is 
On August 17, 1953, such legislation was passed 
chinery and equipment for the manufacture of 
Therefore, until August, 1958, no tariff could 
ied on such goods. 4~ Moreover, there is always a 
chanc the this exemption will be extended, since the 
industry will be vital to the Brazilian economy 
ars to come. 
) Personnel Problems. 
a) Top-Management Personnel. 
The higher echelons of the staff at the plant 
const tute top-management personnel referred to here. 
This Jroup is usually recruite~ from the country 
origi ating the capital. The main office may be 
* 65, PP• 10-11. 
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establ shed in another country, but these officers at 
the pltnt must live and work in Brazil. One of the 
most i portant qualifications of these €xecutives is 
their illingness to 1e arn the language, V\hich is Portu-
gese. Willingness is emphasizedhere, for any intelligent 
indivi ual can learn a language sufficiently.to under~ 
stand enerally what is going on. It is true that the 
an enterprise can surround himself with 
al assistants and do a successful job at direct-
~ ing the 1 operation of the organization; but it is evi-
dent th t the amount of paper work is doubled, if not 
f, and that he is barred from entering effectively 
into ac ual operations. Although it is true that an 
increas 1ng number of Brazilians are learning English, it 
is an a kward and unnatural thing for anyone to have to 
speak a foreign laqguage in his own countr,r. Anyone 
' 
who has spent any time 'in Brazil will bear witness t0 
the impo tance of person~elrelations in conducting 
customer , employees or government officials. And it 
. . 
is impos ible to establish good personal relations with~ 
.J.!-
out spea ing the language of the country.' 
-!1- 26, pp 30. 
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j 
y 
Another qualification for a local manager 
he must have a f~ xible temperament, capable 
of ace pting and ~usting to new surroundings. 'condi-
tions in Brazil are far different from those in the 
United tates, especially in the interior, and the 
of the people is also different. No person 
.can do effective job, regardless of his technical 
ations, if he or his famifuy cannot adjust to 
the new environment. This may be a very intangible 
fa~tor, but it requires careful consideration. 
Careful selection of plant personnel is 
absolut ly necessary, since heavy expenses are in-
sending them abraod. Once the selections 
are mad , they should be gtven full authority in the 
of personnel in the plant, in the development 
rcial procedures, and in operating methods 
which a e compatib.le with local conditions. The 
methods concerning these points which have been de-
n a foreign country may not be workable under 
~ ~r~~~ ly different conditions that exist in Brazil. · 
b) Technicians 
The level of education is considerably lower 
in Brazil than that of the United States. Only 
~~ 26' pp 28-32. 
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primar education is compulsory and free. Secondary 
educat on is also provided free by the government, but 
it is· vailable to only a small percentage of the popu-
lation. Many states have official universities, and 
there are 280 private schools of higher learning, but 
1 schools are few and far between.* There 
hool as yet that includes in its curriculum a 
course on cement manufacturing. Lack of 
higher education is definitely the main reason why 
Brazil acks teo.bnical personnel. Therefore, the 
establi hment of a cement mill in Brazil requires the 
importa ion of engineers and technicians for the in-
stallatfon of the machinery as well as for its main-
tenance and operation. 
c) Labor Laws in Brazil and the Unions. 
Labor legislation in Brazil had its beginning 
at the c ose of World War I, influenced by growin~ in-
dustrial employment and the establishment of the Inter-
national Labor Office. The first important law pro-
vided fo accident compensation, which was later extended 
to occup tional diseases. This was followed by laws 
protecti g women and minors, regulating industrial 
hygiene, and providing annual vacations with pay • 
• 
~" 3, PP• 9-20. 
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The filst social-security instutition was established 
in 192l. Later on, a Ministry of Labor was created. 
In 194,, the labor laws were consolidated, and have 
been ~ended in some particulars. Some of the princi-
pal provisions, oeai~es the ones mentioned above, are 
the fo lowing: 
1) Each worker must have a card (carteira 
f 
Professcional) on which a record of employment and 
tion must be kept. 
2) The working day is normally limited to 
eignt h.urs a day and forty-eight ~ours per week. The 
minimum overtime pay is 20% higher than the.normal pay. 
3) Provision is made for minimum wages, the 
rates O· which are established from time to time. They 
differ n different localities of the country, with 
Rio de aneiro and Sao Paulo usually the-highest. 
4) The government recognizes the rig~t to 
strike, with disputes subject to final decision ~y 
labor courts. 
5) Laborers are entitled to have the day off 
on publi holidays, and vacations with pay after one 
year of mployment. 
6) A weekly rest of twenty-four hours must be 
granted. 
7) An employee who has been employed for 
more tha ten years shall not be dismissed, except for 
111. 
a seri,us offense (force Majeure) duly established by 
compet 
ciatio 
Minist 
* authority. 
As for the labor unions and industrial ~sao­
they can be formed subject to approval by the 
of Labor. The organization of national con-
federattons must be approved by the President of Brazil. 
The'act vities of the unions haVte always been closely 
supervi ed by the government partly to prevent financial 
abuses, and more recently to prevent Communist domina-
tions. Because of the official restraint on their 
activities, the existing unions function primarily'as 
welfare *.J~ rganizations. ' The evolution of democratic 
ons has been greatly retarded by the Communist 
antecederts of many of the labor organizers and 
repressi\e tactics of the government. *.JBf> 
fi) Rules Regarding Foreign Employees. 
the 
In the labor code and legislation of Brazil, 
there ar several rules regarding foreign employees. 
Foreigner may not be employed unless permanent visas 
obtained, but special temporary visas for 
teachers nd technicians entering Brazil for specific 
* 4, PP• 37-239. 
~H~ 4, PP• 239-240 • 
.JBm 36, p • 2. 
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purposes can be issued. Their length of stay will pro-
bably be limited, and also they cannot pF,actice for 
the general public. 
Two-thirds of all the employees of any industry 
or commercial firm must be Brazilians. A Brazilian 
and a foreigner doing the same work must receive the 
same pay. The employer m~st submit an annual repor~ 
to the government indicating positions and duties. All 
accounting reports must be authenticated by an account-
ant registered in Brazil. * 
E) Finance 
1} Status of Foreign Capital. 
Prior to the 1930's, foreign capital.receive·d 
the same treatment legally as domestic capital; In 
fact, in some cases there was encouragement in the fonn 
of lower taxes or exemption from taxes, exemption of 
import duties on some articles, loans of money at a 
lower interest rate, or a guaranteed minimum return on 
invested capital. After 1930, however, the so-called 
"Estado novo" (new state) program initiated a change 
in policy. Laws were passed ood administrative measures 
were taken in subsequent years to limit and restrain 
direct foreign investment in certain branches of 
* 65, PP• 10~11. 
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indus try. Mining, commercial ban king, an d. insurance 
are some of the fields that were affected. But after 
World War II, the trend was reversed again, to more 
liberal provisions for foreign investments. Still 
the legal status of foreign capital in some branches 
of industry is ambiguous owing to the fact that some 
legislative action passed in'the thirties has not been 
repealed. With the exception of Petrobras (the petro~ 
leum monopolyj there are no limitations or restrictions 
on foreign participation of minority interests in 
otherwise restricted ownership of Brazilian concerns or 
corporations. These regulations, however, have no 
direct effect on foreign investment in the cement 
field. ~f. The following two rules may have some effect 
on the choice of a plant site. (1) For security reasons 
foreigners are forbidden to acquire land within 150 
kilometers of Brazil's frontier. (2} Perpetual lease nn 
marine land and land on the margin of rivers m d h goons 
influenced by the tide may be granted only to Brazilians 
or Brazilian companies, unless the government specifica-
lly authorizes a foreigner to acquire such rights.~~ 
.;~ 60, PP• 56. 
~H~ 68, PP• 1-3. 
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The Cohstutition of 1946, which is in effect 
now, establishes the principle of legal equality be-
tween Brazilians and foreigners, including corporations. 
This same constitution also assures inviolable proper~ 
rights to foreign individuals and corporation residents 
in Brazil on the same basis as to Brazilian nationals. 
However, in one of the articles it was pointed out that 
expropriations can be made for public necessity or social 
interest, but that just compensation for the property . 
shall be paid in money. 
The particular industries which at present have 
control concerning foreign in~estments are: mining, pet• 
roleum, hydroelectric power, bankiag, insurance, ship-
ping, m d air transportation. This does not mean that 
foreign capital is not allowed; it merely signifies 
the foreign companies are treated different~y from 
national companies in these fields. Some of them still 
. i * represent good investment opportun~t es. 
2) Exchange Control 
In a capitalistic system, profit is the prime 
motive for investment. In past years, American capital 
has often hesitated to venture abroad, because some 
control systems in foreigh countries do not allow free 
remittance of profit back in the invest9r, therefore, 
~t' 60, rnpp. 56-58. 
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it is natural to examine the control system of Brazil 
before any large investment such as establishing a 
cement factory, is made. No matter how profitable 
the project may loolu,1 inability to transfer the pro-
ject back to the original investor destroys all the 
incentive for investing. 
Evers ince the early Thirties, Brazil has 
utilized an exchange control system with multiple . 
exchange rates. The amount of pressure exerted for 
a tight policy has varied acconding to Brazil's 
external payment situation. After the end of World 
War II, Brazil hoped to attract private foreign capi-
I . 
tal; and at the beginning of 1946, a new exchange con-
trol dealing with foreign investments was initiated. 
By registering their investment with the Bank of Brazil, 
foreigners could remit. up to 8~ of their registered 
capital at the official rate of e4change. Af~er this, 
another remittance up to 20~ could be made also at the 
official exchange rate, but it would be counted as 
capital repatriation. Therefore, this would reduce 
the registerea·capital, which in'effect would reduce 
the limit of the next year's dividend remittance. 
However, other transfers ctSulCir-be~ mad~·-=a:b t a niuc·hl11ess 
favorable "c®b" rate of exchange,. or the excess yield 
... 
could be transferred in five yearly installments. 
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Another encouragement to foreign investors was that 
their capital could be allowed to be registered in the 
currency of the originating country, thus giving the 
effect of a hedge against inflation in Brazil ~n the 
B% remittance limitation. The reinvested capital, 
however, had to be re.gistered in Brazilian cruzeiros. 4} 
These regulations lasted about one year, and 
1947 once again saw the tightening of the exchange 
policy as Brazil's foreign payment position grew worse. 
First a system of priority was set up, and at the end 
of the year no convertible currency was allocated for 
remittance. By the beginning of· 1948, 5% tax was in-
troduced on most exchange remittances. But things 
turned for the better when Brazil's import control was 
established and, rigidly maintained. By the end of 
the year, exchanges were once again available for the 
transfer of a large portion of the dividends. 
By 1952, the balance of payments reve~ted to 
a bad position and subsequently a tight exchange 
policy with respect to foreign investment remittances 
was again introduced. All profits which had been trans~ 
ferred abroad since 1945 in excess of the 8% allowed we~e 
decreed to be a withdrawal of capital, therefore, the 
-if 60, PP• 58. 
basis on which the a% profit transfer was calculated 
was tremendously reduced. Furthermore, the former 5% 
tax was raised to a% for all foreign-exchange remittance.t 
The tide turned again in 1953, and a free 
exchange market was established. The operation of this 
market permits foreign capital to enter and leave Brazil 
freely, and permits the remittance of any desired 
118. 
amount of interest,profit, dividend, or royalty payments.~~ 
Foreign investments now no 1 onger have to be registered 
with the Bank of Brazil. However, preferential traatment 
and other benefits are available for some industries if 
they are approved ror registration by the Council of the 
Superintendency of Money and Credit (Superintendencia 
do Moeda e da Credito, or better known as SUMOC).New 
projects that are eligible must be fully do~umented with 
certain specified details, and submitted for approval 
by the Commission for the Registration of Foreign In-
vestments and Financing, ~apartment of Registration and 
Priori ties, SUMOC., -tHH~ 
New cement mills are eligible, since they are 
-
defined as capital investments important to the national 
* 60, PP• 58-59. 
*i~ 60, PP• 59. 
*** 65, PP• 4-5. 
economy. Approval for registration depends on the 
merit of each .individual case. If a mill is approved 
for registration, the main adv~ntages will lie 1n the 
future. Beginning·ten years after the enterprise 
starts operation, capital can be withdrawn at the 
official rate of exchange at the rate of 10% to 20% 
annually. Meanwhile the earnings not remitted through 
the free exchange market are eligible for registration 
~fo as foreign capital. 
From this account it can be seen that the 
exchange picture is not bright. There are ~any ups 
and downs, with no definite policy to speak of. But 
one thing is quite certain; that is, the exchange 
control policy corresponds very closely to Brazil's 
balance-of-payment position. On the basis of this 
observation, the outlook is brighter as far as taking 
profits out of Brazil is concerned. Brazil's balance 
of payments has begun to turh favorable in the past 
two years, and there are signs pointing to continuous 
improvement. Therefore, it is expected that the free• 
ma~ket-exchange method will remain in effect, and possi-
bly remittances at the official rate of exchange will 
again be available • 
. -s~ 65, PP• 4-6• 
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3) Taxation. 
In general, ~oreign concerns are taxed by th$ 
same method as domestic enterprises. The pro~it tax 
on corporations is comparatively much lower th~n that 
o~ the United States. A 10% tax on income up to 100,000 
Cruzeiros, and 15% in excess o~ 500,000 Cruzeiros 
(approximately $7,000 according to the present ~ree~~rket­
exchange rates) is levied at the present time. Public 
utilities are in a more ~avorable position as ~ar as 
income tax is concerned. They have only an 8% tax on all 
pr.o~its under 12% o~ the capital invested. Just as in the 
Un~ted States system, all dividends on common shares are 
taxed. However, there is a slight di~~erence. In Brazil, 
a ~lat tax rate o~ 20% is withheld at the source ~or all 
declared dividends. For a ~oreign branch office or plant, 
the tax rate is slightly di~ferent; 15% on the Brazilian 
income taxed at the source plus the normal tax on corporate 
pro~its. To encourage re~investment in Brazil, the 
withholding tax does not apply to pro~its used ~or the 
.. 
expansion of p:eesent ~acilities."';' 
In 1951 there was a new tax introduced. The 
purpose o~ the tax was to establish a special fund ad-
ministered by the National Bank of Economic Development. 
~z. 60, pp. 59. 
The rate was in the form of a su;rata:x: of 15% of the amount 
of income tax, plus 3% tax on addition to reserves and 
undisturbed profits. However, it is promised that at 
the end of five years, 5% bonds will be issued for the 
new tax paid plus interest. Therefore, this new tax is 
a type of force loan for the development of the country, 
and eventually will be returned. 
Recently a sub-commission of the Joint Brazil-
U. s. Technical Commission made some observations and 
recommendations.on the tax structure regarding foreign 
investments. One was to establish a bilateral treaty 
with countries that have large investments in Brazil, to 
eliminate double taxation on income from these foreign 
investments. Another was that Brazil might investigate 
the possibility of granting some tax concession (other 
than income tax) on foreign investments in some indust-
rial fields that are essential to the development of 
the country. This, of course, can only be done pro-
vided that they are not unfair to the present obes. 
The Commission also recommended that "the Brazi"lian 
tax rates should not be higher than those of the capi-
tal exporting countries, so that it would encourage 
reinvestment of the profits of these foreign projects. 
This is based on the assumption that the reinvested 
money is not taxed in the country where the~ capital 
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originated. ~n the basis of these observations, it can 
be safely predicted that the tax advantage existing in 
Bra~il over that of the United States may increase in 
the future, making investments even more profitable from 
the tax viewpoint. 4} 
4) Banking Facilities in Brazil. 
Brazilian banks have greatly inc~eased in 
number and resources over the past two and a half decades. 
A large number of banks and banking houses were organi~ 
zed during the early 1940's. On December 31, 1947, there 
were 230 banks in operation, 212 banking houses, 319 
credit cooperatives, and 2,200 branches of banks or 
~Ht. banking houses, a total of 2,961. ' 
The Bank of Brazil, a government--controlled 
institution is by far the largest commercial bank in 
Brazil. It has 360 branches located throughout the 
?{-~~~~ count~y. Among other banking functions, it also 
acts as the fiscal agent for the government, holds 
government accounts, floats government securities, 
makes loans to federal, state, and municipal governments 
and agencies, and assists in collecting revenues. In 
4~ 60, PP• 59. 
** 4, PP• 279. 
~h"h~ 29, PP• l9o 
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Figure VII. 
Banking Turnover in Brazil 
Loans and Deposits 
(End-or-year balances) 
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the yaar 1955, the Bank of Brazil made more loans than 
the rest of the banks combines, and held over 40% of 
* the total deposits •, 
The Bank of Brazil is rea~~y several institu-
tions in one. Besides its large commercial banking 
business, it operates a clearing house for checks. In 
addition, there are some semi-autonomous departments, 
for which the bank provides housing and general banking 
functions, which operate under the general supervision 
of the president of the bank. Some important semi~ 
autonomous departments include: (1) The Carteira de 
Redescontos (Rediscount Department) established fo.r the 
purpose of discounting short-term papers and issuing 
paper currency against such discounts, similar to an 
operation performed by the Federal Reserve System in the 
United States; (2) The Carteira de Cambio (Exchange 
Department), which supervises exchange operations; (3) 
The Carteira de Credito Agricola e Industrial (Depart-
ment of Agricultural end Industrial Credit), which pro~ 
vi~es loans for farmers, eattle raisers, and inaustrial~ 
ists, especially industries using agricultural ·raw 
materials; and (4) The Carteira de Exportacao (Export 
and Import Department), which implements export and 
import controls, and allocates goods.~H~ 
i~ 4, PP• 281. 
iHt- 4, PP• 281-284. 
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Interest rates in Brazil are three or fou~ 
times a s high as the prevailing rates in most countries. 
The rediscount rate of the Bank of Bra~il is 6%. A laW!? 
established the maximum interest rate as 12%, but indi• 
vidual lenders and small banking houses collect more 
through miscellaneous charges and commissions. The 
chief reason for the high rates are the large profits 
obtained by commercial and industrial enterprises, and 
the long run tendency toward depreciation of the Brazilian 
currency.{~ 
The field of banking, at the present time, doea 
not attract large amounts of private capital f:or the 
following reasons: (1) the inflationary nature of the 
Brazilian economy causes commercial banks to take on 
added risks in loans and mortgages; (2) private capital 
can easily obtain a higher rate of return by investing 
in industries and real estates; (3) The Bank of Brazil, 
which regulates banking in the country, offers strong 
competition in the field of commercial banking. 
The banking centers in Brazil, as is to be 
' 
expected, are in the cities of Rio de Janeiro, the seat 
of ·the Federal government; and Sao Paulo, the largest 
industrial center in South America. Various foreign 
* 4, pp. 287-288. 
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·banks operate branches at both of these cities, in~ 
eluding two American commercial banks, the National City 
Bank of New York, and The First National Bank of Boston.~~ 
* 4, PP• 366. 
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VI. FACTORS AFFECTING THE USE OF AMERICAN CAPITAL IN 
BRAZIL - FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE POINTS 
A) Types of Organization Possible for Foreign Concern 
In Brazil. 
If a foreign individual or concern desires 
to do business in Brazil on an independent basis, an 
agent residing in the country can be appointed or can 
organize a Brazilian concern. A firm may also obtain 
authorization to operate a branch in Brazil. 
For a proposed new industrial project, the 
discussion wtll be confined to operating a branch of a 
foreign company or a Brazilian firm. 
Operating as a foreign company in Brazil, the 
branch or subsidiary will be governed under a special 
set of regulations. There are various procedures to be 
followed in obtaining permission to operate. One of 
the primary requirements in registering is a full dis-
closure by the parent company with the application.* 
There are disadvantages and advantages to each 
possible type of organization. Consider a U.S. concern 
for example. If it operates a branch in Brazil, there 
might be tax advantages. The United States internal 
revenue code grants a reduction in tax of 14% to 
Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations. This type of 
4~ 65, PP• 3-4. 
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organization is de~ined as a United States corporation 
which (1) does all its business in the Western Hemisphere, 
(2) derives at ~ast 95% of its grosg income outside o~ 
the United States, (3) derives at least 90% o~ its gross 
income ~ro~ the active conduct o~ a trade or business. 
Other advantages are that it can retain the name of the 
parent company, and that meetings o~ stockholders a~d 
directors are allowed to be held in the home office. 
The disadvantages are presented as follows: 
(1) Foreign corporations may be discriminated against 
I 
as a class by future legislation; (2) They are subject 
to additional Brazilian income tax on their earnings, 
except the amounts used for expansion; and (3) The 
entire capi'tal and assets o~ the whole organization 
(not merely the portion in Brazil) are under the juris-
diction of Brazilian courts."~ 
As for the Brazilian organization, there are 
several types including individual firms, partnerships, 
Sociedade por Quotas de Responsibilidade Limitada, and 
Sociedade anonima. For an industrial investment, dis-
cussion will be confined to the latter two types, since 
the ~irst two wi 11 not be sui table. 
The Sociedade por Quotas de Responsibilidade 
Limitada is a type of company with many of the advantages 
{~ 65, PP• 4-5. 
of a corporation, and yet similar to a partnership, in 
the lack of formalities and publicity attaching to its 
formation and operation. It is reported that there are 
more companies. organized under this type than any other 
in Brazil. 
The Sociedade por Quotas must have at least 
two shareholders. Foreign corporations or non-residents 
may be the only shareholders, b~t the company must pro~ 
vide a resident of Brazil or a Brazilian with the power 
of attorney to enable him to sign the contract of organ-
ization and to vote the shares held by the foretgn 
interests. When a foreign corporation or an individual 
forms such an organization, it is customary to have at 
least-two other shareholders, since the managing director 
of the sociedade is required by hw to be a local 
resident and a shareholder. If the~e were only two share-
holders, his death would automatically dissolve the 
* organization. 
The shares of the Sociedade. por Quotas are 
not represented by stock certificates, and may not be 
transferred to outside parties without the consent of 
all the other shareholders~ All the firms under this 
type of organization must include the word "Limitada" 
~{- 65, pp. 5-6. 
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at the end of the title. As for the Sociedade Anonima 
it is the equivalent of a corporation in the United 
States. There are, however, some minor differences, 
such as: (1) All shares must have a par value; (2) All 
shares must be sold at par or higher; (3) The capital 
must be fully subscribed before the formation of the 
corporation; and (4) Socidade Anonmia is a creature of 
contract between shareholders rather than m entity 
existing by reason of charter. All the companies of 
this type have the letters S.A. or Cia. at the end 
of the full name.* 
A sociedade Anonima must be administered by 
one or more directors who need not necessarily be 
shareholders. They must, however, be at least residents 
of Brazil. In fact, all the directors usually five, 
with three constituting a ~uorum, must be permanent resi-
dents, although there is no restpiction as to 
nationalities. 
Another requirement or Sociedade Anonima is 
that it must have a fiscal council (Conselho Fiscal) 
having at least three members with an equal number of 
alternates elected at the annual stockholderst meeting. 
They, again, must be residents of Brazil, but not 
* 65, PP• 5-6. 
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necessarily shareholders. The duty of this council is 
to check the accounts of the corporation at least once 
each quarter and report to the stockholders' meeting as 
tb tqe general operations and affairs of the corporation. 
If foreign interests are to organize a 
Sociedade Anonima, they must supply a power of attorney 
to a Brazilian permanent resident authorizing bhe or-
ganization of such a concern. The f oreigh interest can, 
however, be the majority stockholder. The corporation 
must have at least seven stockholders, but they do not 
have to be permanent residents or citizens, as required 
of the directors. There are absolutely no restrictions 
to the nationality of the shareholders in a Brazilian 
corporation. ~f-
The following is a list of advantages and dis-
advantages, when Sociedade Anonmia is compared with 
Sociedade por ~uotas de Responsibilidade Limitada • 
.I~·· Advantages of Sociedade Anon±ma::' .,,. 
(1) If there are several independent stock-
holders, the Sociedade Anonima form or organization is 
more adaptable, as the holdings are evidenced by stock 
certificates and can be more readily transferred. 
~:- 65, PP• 7 • 
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(2) Preferred stocks or debentures may be 
issued by Sociedade Anonima. Such securities may not 
be issued by Sociedade por Quotas, although some pre-· 
ferenti~ rights may be granted to certain stock-
holders. 
(3) The liability of each shareholder in 
the Sociedade Anonima is li~ited to the amount sub-
scribed by him, whereas in Sociedade por (Quotas each 
shareholder is jointly and severally responsible for 
all the unpaid subscriptions. 
(4) Shares payable to bearer may be issued 
only by Sociedade Anonima. 
(5) Certific~tes issued by Sociedade Anonima 
can be the subject of a pledge, but shares in Sociedade 
por, Quotas cannot. 
(6) If a Sociedade por Quotas is organized 
with foreign interests holdingnearly 100~ of the shares, 
and the shares are placed in the names of nominal owners 
in Brazil, it is not feasible·under existing Brazilian 
laws to draw papeFs of assignment after the death of 
the nominee. 
Advantages of the Spciedade por Quotas.~} 
(1) It is not necessary to publish an annuaL 
balance sheet and a profit and loss statement, as in the 
case of the Sociedade Anonima. 
* 65. PP• 7-8. 
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(2) Requirements applicable to Sociedade 
Anonima for the publication of the calling of a stock-
holders' meeting and the minutes of the meeting, and for 
keeping up to date the stockholders' books and records, 
are not applicable to Sociedade por Quotas. 
(3) Less time and expense are required in the 
organization of the Sociedade por Quotas, as well as 
fewer formalities after the company begins to function. 
(4) Only two shareholders are necessary to 
organize a Sociedade por Quotas (although three are 
advisable, as stated before), whereas the'sociedade 
Anonima must have at least seven stockholders at all 
times; also it is not necessary to have a fiscal council, 
as is required of the Sociedade Anonima. 
( 5) Less .time and expense are involved in 
the amendment of the contract of organization of a 
Sociedade por Quotas. 
(6) The principal shareholder in a Sociedade 
por Quotas is protected by the provision that no share-
holder may transfer his shares to a third party without 
the consent. of all the other shareholders; this pro-
tection is lacking under Sociedade Anonima. However, 
it must be said that this inflexibility may very well 
turn out to be a disadvantage rather than an advantage, 
depending on each individual case. 
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(7) It is not required that 10% of the 
capital subscribed must be paid in before the company 
is organized, or that a legal reserve be built up until 
it reaches 20% of the capital, as in the case of 
Sociedade Anonima. In Sociedade Anonima, 5% of the net 
profit must be set aside for legal reserves until it 
reaches 20% of the capital• 
(8) It is not necessary to register.the shares 
with the local stock exchange, as is required of 
Sociedade Anonima. 
(9) A Sociedade por Quotas may at any time 
be transferred into a Sociadade Anonima without in-
curring an~ additional taxation on the transferal, 
although the reverse is not possible. 
Above are the pros and cons of eac~ type of 
organization, and the decision as to which one to adopt 
will depend on each irldividual case. A consultation 
with a Brazilian corporati·on lawyer is quite necessary 
before the type is determined. If a decision favors 
organizing a Brazilian concern, it will require working 
closely with one or several residents or citizens of 
Brazil •. However, at present it is fairly simple to ob-
tain a permanent reS.idence in Brazil, as long as the 
person has a steady job in the country. Any u. S. 
citizen aan apply at the local Brazilian consular office 
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and obtain such a status without too much difficulty. 
The_•person, of course, will still be .able to' keep his 
6\vn nationality. It would be a great advantage if 
several of the top management staff, es~ecially the 
ones in the plant, acquired resident status. 
B) Role of United States and Other Foreign Capital in the 
Economic Growth of Br.azil 
Up to the Ja te 1920 1s, foreign inv:estments in 
Brazil were predominently British and mainly in the 
railway and mining industries. The rapid increase of 
. 
. 
direct investment for the United States in the 21's, 
liq1idation of some British interests during and after 
I 
World War II, and the large pQstwar expansion of 
American investments, have made the United ~tates by 
far the largest investor in Brazil at the present time. 
I 
Most of the capital, in contrast to the British, is 
concentrated in manufacturing, public utilities and 
petroleum distribution.~~ 
* 60, PP• 5l. 
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TABLE XII. 
United ·States: -Eiirec·t :I!rr\re§ltm~nt in''B!tazil. 
1929, 1943, 1950 
(in millions of dollars) 
Field of Investment 1929 ~ 1943 ~ 1950 ~ 
Manufacturing 46 23.7 66 28.3 285 44.2 
Petroleum (including 
distribution) 23 11.8 30 12.9 112 17.4 
Trade 16 8.2 29 12.4 73 11.3 
Public Utilities, 
Transportation 97 50.0 88 37.8 138 21.4 
Others. 12 6.3 20 8.6 36 5.7 
Total 194 100.0 233 100.0 644 100.0 
Source: All data except percentages are from Foreign 
Capital in Latin America; United Nation, New 
York; l955; Page 51. Percentages calculated 
by the author. 
The trend of expanding United States invest~ 
ments in continuing up to the Ir esent. The latest 1952 
figures showed the total to be 1,013 million dollars 
with 47% in manufacturing. Compared with American 
capital invested in other Latin-American countries, that 
in Brazil is the second largest, following closely that 
of Venezuela. But in this latter country, o~er 80~ 
of the investments is ·in the field of petroleum. No 
new figures are yet available, but it is possible that 
' Brazil is now occupying first place. President 
Kubitschek announced in the earlier part of 1957, that 
]36. 
200 million dollars worth of new investments were made 
by United States concerns in Brazil during 1956. In 
recent years, partly as a consequence of Brazilian 
economic policies, there has been a relative·ly greater 
increase in United States participation in B~azilian 
controlled concerns for the manufactpring of products 
under Brazilian trade names, compared with investments 
in branch plants md subsidiaries,.* 
Besides the United States sod Britain, there 
are several other countries which occupy a position of 
minor importance as far as capital invested in Brazil 
is concerned. 
TABLE XIII. 
Foreign Capital Invested in Commercial Firms and 
Incorporated Business Enterprises Registered With The 
Bank of Brazil, December 31st., 1950 
(in millions of currencies indicated) 
Qreditor Country 
and Units of 
Currency 
United States 
Dollars 
Cruzeiros 
United Kingdom 
Pounds Sterling 
Cruzeiros 
.Jt- 60, PP• 51 ... 52. 
Amounts 
Registered 
389.6 
10,497.7 
38.4 
2,353.8 
Total 
Equ:ivalen t 
Cruzeiros in Dollars % 
17,792.0 950.4 71,.00 
4,368.4 
Creditor Country 
and Units of' 
Currency 
"France 
French Francs 
Cruzeiros 
Belgium 
Belgian Francs 
Cruzeiros 
Uruguay 
Uruguayan Pesos 
Cruzeiros 
Switzerland 
Swiss Francs 
Cruzeiros 
Portugal 
Escudos 
Cruzeiros 
Sweden 
Swedish Kronor 
Cruzeiros 
Argentina 
Argentine Pesos 
Cruzeiros 
Netherlands 
Cruzeiros 
Others 
Cruzeiros 
Total 
TABLE XIII. (cont.) 
Amounts 
Register-ed 
173.4 
806.1 
64.7 
785.9 
.• . 1 
~ _, 
13.1 
117.4 
2.9 
54.5 
1.0 
61.7 
46.5 
72.1 
Cruzeiros 
815.4 
727.2 
250.3 
126.0 
65.0 
63.1 
46.5 
72.1 
15,718.5 25,136.2 
Equivalent 
in :Dollars ofo 
43.5 3.20 
58.8 2.80 
~3.4 1.00 
6.7 o.oo 
3.4 0.25 
3.2 0.25 
2.4 0.20 
3.8 0.30 
1,342.7 100.00 
Source: All data except the percentages f'rom Foreign 
Capital in Latin America; United NatiOn$ New 
York; Page 52; Percentages calculated by the 
author. 
It must be mentioned that the above table used 
tmofficial rate of 18.72 Cr. to one u.S. dollar as the 
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conversion rate, compared with the rree market rate of 
around 70 IDr. to one dollar. The table is useful, 
however, as it shows the relative importance of the 
United States investments compared with thos~ of other 
foreign countr1es. 
In the branch of manufacturing, aarge sums 
of American capital can be found in the following fields 
of activity: cement, meat packing, assembly of auto-
,, ' 
mobile, refrigerators and other elec~rical appliances, 
tires, .. chemicals, pharmaceuticals, rayon, rubber goods 
and light bulbs. Large United Staues corporations 
operating branches· or subsidiaries in Brazil include: 
General Electric, General Motors, Westinghouse Inter~ 
national, Lone Star Cement Cor~oration, Sears Roebuck, 
J 
Johnson & Johnson, Union Carbon and Carbide, Goodyear, 
Armou~ Meat Packing, Corn Products Refining Company, 
IBM, and many, many others. ~f. 
The present phase of economic development 
in Brazil, characterized by the growth of manufacturing 
industries for domestic consumption, started at the 
close of the nineteenth century. The extent to which 
roreign capital has been engaged in this development 
has varied. The expansion achieved during the two world 
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wars was mainly through domestic financing. On the other 
hand, during the prosperous periods of 1906 to 1912 and 
1926 to 1930, large f0reign contributions we~e made to-
wards Brazil's industrialization. At the end of World 
War II, foreign capital again poured into the country 
at a high rate. On the whole, however, the role of 
foreign direct investment in manufacturing has been 
limited. This capital represents a small percentage 
of the entire amount, but foreign investors have brought 
with them new types of processing and have trans-
mitted technical knowledge and trained personnel, all 
of which is of great importance to the economic develop-
ment of Brazi 1. *""7 
C) Favorable Points 
An examination of the favorable side of the 
prospect of investing Am~rican capital in Brazil shows 
the first and foremost factor is the high rate of return. 
In the year 1955, the percentages earned on capital 
invested for some of the leading industries are: tires 
65~, cement 52~, electric motors 43%, e~vator~ 40%, 
department stores 35%, perfume 34%, ceramics 32%, and 
steel 30%.~~f-
* 15, PP• 100-103. 
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Furthermore, the corporate income tax and the tax on 
stocks are lower than in the United States. There is 
no doubt that industries in Brazil enjoy a·higher rate 
of profit than those operating in America. 
In Brazil, there is a shortage of almost all 
manufactured goods. Therefore, industries have less 
co,mpeti tion or, in some cases, no competition in the 
area covered by their sales. A lack of competitors 
has allowed many plants to operate with inefficient and 
antique equipment. An American investor, with new 
machines and management techniques developed in the 
highly competitive business worid that exists here, will 
have a big advantage when he moves down to Brazil. 
The present administration headed by President 
Kubitschek, who was inaugurated at the start of 1956, 
* has· shown great interest in foreign capital. Several 
new regulations were initiated, which were designed to 
attract investments in capital goods in Brazil. Perhaps 
the best way to illustrate the unlimited opportunities 
that exist in Brazil for American capital is to mention 
the fact that a listing of 200 million dollars of 
private American funds is awaiting government approval 
to enter Brazil; and an official announcement of permits 
~~ 39, pp. 1. 
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already granted to American companies includes several 
major corporations. The list of companies investing 
more than one million dollars includes: (1 ).~Celanese 
Corporation of America and Associates, with $3,555,585 
for the production of carbon black from by-products 
of the Brazilian state Oubatao oil refinery; {2) Morey 
Machinery Company, with $3,748,898 for the manufacture 
of automobile parts; (3) Union Carbide, with $1,997,854 
for a polyethylene resin plant; (4) Caterpillar Tractor 
Company, with $1,600,203 to produce parts and accessor-
ies for its tractor line; and (5) International General 
Electric, with $1,272,400. Needless to say, there are 
many American investment projects under one million 
,_. dollars • .-r From these investments of American business 
1m:Srq it is easy to draw the conclusion that they believe 
Brazil offers wonderful business opportunities, especi-
ally under the present government administration. 
To strengthen further the favorable aspect 
of investing in Brazil, we mew examine the history of 
the General Electr.ic subsidiary in Brazil. Recently 
three Braz1.lian employees celebrated their fortieth 
year of service with General Electric, S .. A. of Brazil.-, 
This illustrates in as imple way the long and mutually 
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profitable relation between International General 
Electric and the country. The activities of General 
Electric started back in 1888, when its predecessor, 
the Edison Company, erected a direct-current steam 
plant in Porto Alegre. In 1900, Sao Paulo got its 
first electric trolley line, using General Electric 
equipment and power. General Electric is associated 
with almost every phase of the development of Brazil. 
Its genera~ors, motors, transformers and heavy electri-
cal equipmen~· have helped develop hydroe~tric power, 
electrify the railroads, improve urban transportation, 
and make possible suc·h projects as the Volta Redonda 
steel mill and industrial plants. Its light bulbs, 
refrigerators, radios, TV sets, and other consumer 
goods can be found in almost all Brazilian homes. The 
company employs 6,700 people, which constitutes one 
of the largest employee groups of any foreign-owned 
manufacturing company in the country. Of this total, 
less than 1% are United States citizens. Its annual 
sales figures are not avallable, but it pays approxi-
mately 100 million cruzeiros in federal, state and 
other taxes within Brazil. The future policy of General 
Electric, S.A. is for expansion in both local manu-
' * facture and f~orts from the United States. 
~~ 20, PP• 20. 
Although few American companies can match the 
history and suc'cessful operation of General Electric 
there are a great number that have found their venture 
in Brazil very profitable~ Besides the ones mentioned 
earlier in this paper, there are: Anderson Clayton & 
Company, Corning Glass Works, E.I. DuPont de Nemours 
& Company, Fires~one Tire and Rubber Company, Gillette 
Safety Razon Company, Parke, Davis & Company, Pullman-
Standard Gar Export Corporation, St. Regis Paper Comp~y, 
The Sherwin-Williams Company, Wayne Pump Company, 
·American Smelting and Refining Company, United States 
Steel Corporation, and many others too numerous to 
. .t~ 
mention.· 
D) Unfavorable Points 
On the unfavorable side of the picture, we 
find the threat of expropriation of foreign companies 
in Brazil. Although the past history does not show 
any such action by the government, and it is very un-
likely during the term of the present administration, 
it cannot be totally discarded, because such action is 
legally permissible. 
]During the last war and right ~fterwards,_ the 
United Stated he~ a privileged position in the Latin 
* 4, PP• 365-366. 
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American market. But as Eurpoean economy is being re-
stored to its prewar condition, competition is steadily 
increasing. Illustrations can be found in,the European 
investments approved by the Brazilian government be-
sides American capital. West Germa~ concerns going 
into Brazil include: Mercedes Benz, for the manufacture 
of heavy trucks and motors; Farbwerke Hoeschst, in 
association with W. R. Grace & Company, to produce DDT, 
caustic soda, cholrine and other chemicals; and 
Mannesmann Aktiengesellschaft for a steel plant at 
Belo Horizonte, the capital of the st.ate of Minas 
Gerais.?~ 
British firms are represented by Textile 
Machinery Makers Ltd., Dunlop Rubper Company, Standard 
Motors Company, Cable & Wireless, Babcock & Wilcox, 
Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Export Company. 
Other European investors include: Societe des 
Usines Chimiques Rhone-Poulenc, S.A. Metallurgique 
d'Aubrives et Villerupt Acieries Reunies de Burbach 
Eich et Dudelange (plant to produce cantri_:tlugal tubing 
for water and sewage installations) of France; Phillips, 
"-G~ the Netherlands for manufacturing lan p bulbs; S.A. 
Braun Boveri & Cia. of Switzerland, for manufacturing 
electrical equipment; Com. Otello Pezzotti, of Italy, 
' 
4fo 45, PP• 6 • 
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for producing bottled gas; A. B. Elektrolux of Sweden; 
* and Aluminium Ltd., of Canada • 
. 1· ~nother point unfavorable to Brazil in regard 
to the cement industry, is the high profit margin enjoyed 
by the cement industry here in the United States. ~r-:} All 
the leading cement companies are using their available 
funds for expansion of facilities here in North America 
rather than venturing abroad. But it must be stated 
that for a newcomer into the field of c~ment manufactur-
ing, it is easier to establish a mill in Brazil, where 
the market is not so competitive and the profit for 
investors would be just as high. 
\ 
An intangible point which might be unfavorable 
is the national sentiment of the people of Brazilo In 
the past, these sentiments lad to the formation of the 
oil monopoly Petrobras. In more recent years, the feel-
I 
ing of economic nationalism has abated somewhat, but it 
is still a potential threat that may possibly lead to 
expropriation actions. 
Exchange and import controls can also be con-
sidered unfavorable points, but they have been thoroughly 
discussed in the previ~us chapters, as well as the 
factors impeding industrialization in Brazil. 
* 45. pp. 6. 
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VII. CONOLUSTONS 
A) Example of an Excellent Location for a Cement Plant.* 
During the author's last trip to Brazil in the 
summer of 1956, a per~onal visit was made to a site 
where a cement plant will eventually be erected. This 
location sati~fied many of the requirements for the 
successful operation of a cement factory. The selected 
site is located near a place called Cabo Frio, which is 
approximately ~00 miles east of the City of Rio de Janeiro 
on the Atlantic seaboard. The plant will be built on 
a piece of land situated between the boast and a lagoon. 
This particular lagoon, connected to the ocean 
only by a very small channel, is extremely shallow but 
contains tremendous deposits of shells. SeveriMlarge 
manufacturers of cement-making equipment in various 
conntries have already analyzed samples of these shells 
·and found them to be-eKceedingly suitable for processing 
into cement. The use of this excellent source of lime, 
which makes up 60-65% by weight of Portland cement, offers 
several very important advantages. Shells are smaller 
and softer than ordinar.1 limestone, therefore, requir-
ing a lesser amount of capital investment in crushers. 
This, in turn, leads to smaller requirements in power, 
building space and technicians. Furthermore, extract-
ing shells in a shallow lagoon requires ~ss equipment 
* 71. 
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and efforttthan does ~ining limestone. Besides this most 
' important of all raw materials, an abundant amount of 
clay and sand can be found all around this lagoon. 
According to conservative estimates by surveyoDs, the 
shell deposits can supply an average plant with two 
kilns producing some 800 tons of cement per day for 
more than 40 years. 
As for the transportation factor, the loca-
tion also offers excellent opportunities. Onthe coastal 
side of the plant site, there is a beautiful inlet with 
deep water. With tne construction of dock facilities, 
coastal vessels or small ocean-going ships will be able 
to dock within sight of the factory. Shipping by 
water being the cheap.est form of transportation, the 
advantages offered by this natural harbor are numerous. 
The market coverage of the product will be broader than 
that of most other cement mills, as it can be distributed 
along the entire Atlantic coast, reaching every port 
with a minimum of cost. Fuel oil, of which large quanti-
ties are needed, can be brough~ in directly by tankers 
from abr:Gad. Machinery, equipment, and other imported 
supplies can all be delivered "to the door" without trans-
ferring to other forms of transportation. 
Besides the convenience of the harbor, a good 
paved highway (according to Brazilian standards) connects 
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Cabo Frio with Rio de Janeiro. Although railroad 
facilities arenot available, all the transportation 
problems can be more than adequately solved by trucking 
and shipping. 
When it comes t~ electric power, the problem 
was solved by purchasing the necessary amount from a 
government-owned thermoelectric plant nearby. The power 
piant was built primarily to furnish electricity for a 
government chemical plant also located near Cabo Frio. 
Negotiations have been completed, and the government, 
in order to encourage new cement manufacturing facilities, 
has consented to provide the electric power. 
This particular plant site, with all the features 
as it stands now, is considered to be one of the best by 
many experts in the cement industry. It meets alTithe 
important factors necessary for successful-cement epera~ 
tion. In preparing this site, the entrepreneurs spent 
a vast amount of time and money. The most difficult 
part was obtaining from the Government the right to 
exploit the shell deposits in this lagoon. The negotia-
tion for electric power aiso proved to be time-consuming; 
but when all these preparations were c ompleted, the entre-
preneurs found themselves in control of a tremendously 
valuable piece of property. 
It is questionable whether another location 
offering all these qualities can be found, but Brazil 
is a vast and undeveloped country, and detailed in-
vestigation might find another Cabo Frio. 
B) Conclusions as to Outlook, Feasibilities and Possible 
Plant Sites in Brazil 
From this research into the Brazilian econorr.w, 
and the cement industry, it is safe to conclude that 
both are in the expansion phase. With the new adminis-
tration very receptive to foreign investments, Brazil 
provides a very good opportunity for United States 
capital. The average profits are higher than thoa:l in 
America with a lower income tax rate. The fear of not 
being able to withdraw capital is not valid here, as 
remittances can be made through the free market. The 
threat of expropriation is theoretically possible, 
but very unlikely in this case as previously explained. 
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To make a heavy investment in Bra.zil, it is 
usually necessary to work closely with som~ government 
divisions, especially in the acquisition of an import 
license for the equipment. Registrationaf' foreign capital, 
establishment of an organization, or negotiation for 
electric power, all may necessitate contact with govern-
ment officials. Good personal relations with the head 
of these departments are invaluable, if they can be 
established. It just cannot be emphasized enough how 
impor·tant good relations with the officials can be, as 
the author of this paper can testify from his personal 
experiences in Brazil. The conditions are different 
from those of the United States, where the establishment 
o.f a private enterprise usually does not concern the 
government. 
To further enphasize what has previously been 
stated in this paper: because of Brazil's growing econ~ 
omy, the rapid increase in the demand for cement still 
continues. Construction activities are at an all-time 
high in Brazil. Yet, in housing alone, the shortage is 
tremendous. According to a survey by the Popular Housing 
Commission and the United Nations, Brazil needs five 
mimlion new houses as an ideal objective. The Commission 
stated that 260,000 new dwellings are needed each.year, 
but only 74,000 units are built annually. Besides 
the ~~rious shortage, owning real estate and housing 
in Br~zil is traditionally connected with prestige. 
Furthermore, real estate holdings are an excellent in-
flation hedge. The government tax policy also heavily 
?~ ~ favors these type of investment. This all~~fuows why 
~f. 11, PP• 34-35• 
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construction activities have been increasing arid will con-
tinue to do so. 
Besides residential housing, office-building 
and industrial-plant construction are progressing at a 
similar fast pace. There are severe shortages in both 
as many new industries ahe being established. New large 
hydraulic power projects such as the Furnas plan, new 
highways, and new airports will similarly require large 
quantities of cement. These needs will be far greater 
than the present cement-producing capacity of Brazil. 
There is no doubt that there will be a great demand 
for cement for years to come. 
The country's overall ret4uirement for cement 
is large, but the market coverage of each cement mill 
is rather limited because of transportation difficulties. 
With a few,possible exceptions, most of the products 
will have to b e sold within a small radius. Therefore, 
the choice of a good plant site is doubly important in 
Brazil, as previously indicated. 
Two areas for a new cement plant seem most 
promising. For the immediate future, the Rio-Sao Paulo 
area is still the best, if raw material requirements can 
be met. Transportation, fuel, power, and other needs 
can most easily be found in this industrial district. 
~~market for cement in this area is the most extensive 
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in Brazil, as heavy construction of both industrial and 
residential projects is proceeding at a ~apid pace. 
For the most distant future, perhaps Minas 
Gerais is a better location. As the name of the State 
implies (Gene~al Minerals), it possesses abundant 
wealth in many types of minerals. The potentialities 
o~ the State in many and varied fields, such as agri~ 
culture, industry, mining hydro-electric power, nuclear 
resources, and others, are boundless. Among the minerals, 
it possesses unlimited Deserves of excellent crystalline, 
non-fossiliferous limestone, which is extremely suit-
able for the manufacturing of cement. Several factories 
are already operating in the State using this excellent 
source of raw materials. 
Not until very recently has Minas Gerais 
come into its own. Industries of all types are slowly 
moving into this area. Hydro-electric power is being 
exploited, along with extensive construction of trans-
portation facilities. It is definitely a state that 
will achieve the greatest develo~ment in the near future.* 
The exact location for the proposed cement 
fac~ory requires personal, on-the-spot investigation; 
but efforts can be concentrated in these two general 
areas, as t~ey offer the west possibilities. 
I 
* 17, PP• 71-75. 
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Finally, it must be stated again tbat Brazil 
offers excellent opportunities to foreign capital and 
certainly the cement industry is one of the most pro-
mising fields for investment. 
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